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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 09:27:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277214</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277214</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277214</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277214</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33717</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33717</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` function in `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` saves remote content to a web-accessible temporary directory using the original URL&amp;#39;s filename and extension (including `.php`). By providing an invalid `resolution` parameter, an attacker triggers an early `die()` via `forbiddenPage()` before the temp file can be moved or cleaned up, leaving an executable PHP file persistently accessible under the web root at `videos/cache/tmpFile/`. Commit 6da79b43484099a0b660d1544a63c07b633ed3a2 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` function in `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` saves remote content to a web-accessible temporary directory using the original URL&amp;#39;s filename and extension (including `.php`). By providing an invalid `resolution` parameter, an attacker triggers an early `die()` via `forbiddenPage()` before the temp file can be moved or cleaned up, leaving an executable PHP file persistently accessible under the web root at `videos/cache/tmpFile/`. Commit 6da79b43484099a0b660d1544a63c07b633ed3a2 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33717</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8wf4-c4x3-h952 — AVideo: Remote Code Execution via PHP Temp File in Encoder downloadURL</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8wf4-c4x3-h952</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` function in `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` saves remote content to a web-accessible temporary directory using the original URL&amp;#39;s filename and extension (including `.php`). By providing an invalid `resolution` parameter, an attacker triggers an early `die()` via `forbiddenPage()` before the temp file can be moved or cleaned up, leaving an executable PHP file persistently accessible under the web root at `videos/cache/tmpFile/`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is a race-free file upload leading to RCE, exploiting a logic flaw in the error handling order of operations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 — File download preserves dangerous extension:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`, when a `downloadURL` parameter is provided, the file is downloaded and saved with the URL&amp;#39;s original basename:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php:361-365
$_FILES[&amp;#39;video&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;] = basename($downloadURL);  // preserves .php extension
$temp = Video::getStoragePath() . &amp;#34;cache/tmpFile/&amp;#34; . $_FILES[&amp;#39;video&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;];
make_path($temp);
$bytesSaved = file_put_contents($temp, $file);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `format` parameter (validated against `$global[&amp;#39;allowedExtension&amp;#39;]` at line 42) is only used later for the *final* destination filename (line 238), not for the temp file. The temp file uses `basename($downloadURL)` directly, allowing any extension including `.php`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 — Resolution validation aborts after file write:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the file is downloaded and written to disk (line 15…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` function in `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` saves remote content to a web-accessible temporary directory using the original URL&amp;#39;s filename and extension (including `.php`). By providing an invalid `resolution` parameter, an attacker triggers an early `die()` via `forbiddenPage()` before the temp file can be moved or cleaned up, leaving an executable PHP file persistently accessible under the web root at `videos/cache/tmpFile/`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is a race-free file upload leading to RCE, exploiting a logic flaw in the error handling order of operations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 — File download preserves dangerous extension:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`, when a `downloadURL` parameter is provided, the file is downloaded and saved with the URL&amp;#39;s original basename:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php:361-365
$_FILES[&amp;#39;video&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;] = basename($downloadURL);  // preserves .php extension
$temp = Video::getStoragePath() . &amp;#34;cache/tmpFile/&amp;#34; . $_FILES[&amp;#39;video&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;];
make_path($temp);
$bytesSaved = file_put_contents($temp, $file);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `format` parameter (validated against `$global[&amp;#39;allowedExtension&amp;#39;]` at line 42) is only used later for the *final* destination filename (line 238), not for the temp file. The temp file uses `basename($downloadURL)` directly, allowing any extension including `.php`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 — Resolution validation aborts after file write:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the file is downloaded and written to disk (line 15…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8wf4-c4x3-h952</guid>
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