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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277135</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277135</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277135</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277135</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33716</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33716</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;: false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence. Commit 388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;: false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence. Commit 388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33716</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2 — AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Live Stream Control via Token Verification URL Override in control.json.php</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9hv9-gvwm-95f2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;: false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists because the `streamerURL` parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:77-79`** — User input overrides server config:
```php
if (!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;streamerURL&amp;#39;])) {
    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[&amp;#39;streamerURL&amp;#39;];
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:83-91`** — The user-controlled value is assigned to the request object:
```php
$obj-&amp;gt;streamerURL = $streamerURL;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:115-126`** — Token verification is sent to the attacker-controlled URL:
```php
$verifyTokenURL = &amp;#34;{$obj-&amp;gt;streamerURL}plugin/Live/verifyToken.json.php?token={$obj-&amp;gt;token}&amp;#34;;
// ...
$content = file_get_contents($verifyTokenURL, false, stream_context_create($arrContextOptions));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legitimate `verifyToken.json.php` performs cryptographic token validation via `Live::decryptHash()` and checks token expiry (12-hour wi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;: false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists because the `streamerURL` parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:77-79`** — User input overrides server config:
```php
if (!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;streamerURL&amp;#39;])) {
    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[&amp;#39;streamerURL&amp;#39;];
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:83-91`** — The user-controlled value is assigned to the request object:
```php
$obj-&amp;gt;streamerURL = $streamerURL;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:115-126`** — Token verification is sent to the attacker-controlled URL:
```php
$verifyTokenURL = &amp;#34;{$obj-&amp;gt;streamerURL}plugin/Live/verifyToken.json.php?token={$obj-&amp;gt;token}&amp;#34;;
// ...
$content = file_get_contents($verifyTokenURL, false, stream_context_create($arrContextOptions));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legitimate `verifyToken.json.php` performs cryptographic token validation via `Live::decryptHash()` and checks token expiry (12-hour wi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9hv9-gvwm-95f2</guid>
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