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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277425</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277425</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277425</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277425</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33683</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33683</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, a sanitization order-of-operations flaw in the user profile &amp;#34;about&amp;#34; field allows any registered user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when other users visit their channel page. The `xss_esc()` function entity-encodes input before `strip_specific_tags()` can match dangerous HTML tags, and `html_entity_decode()` on output reverses the encoding, restoring the raw malicious HTML. Commit 7cfdc380dae1e56bbb5de581470d9e9957445df0 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, a sanitization order-of-operations flaw in the user profile &amp;#34;about&amp;#34; field allows any registered user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when other users visit their channel page. The `xss_esc()` function entity-encodes input before `strip_specific_tags()` can match dangerous HTML tags, and `html_entity_decode()` on output reverses the encoding, restoring the raw malicious HTML. Commit 7cfdc380dae1e56bbb5de581470d9e9957445df0 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33683</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-ghx5-7jjg-q2j7 — AVideo vulnerable to Stored XSS via html_entity_decode() Reversing xss_esc() Sanitization in Channel About Field</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ghx5-7jjg-q2j7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sanitization order-of-operations flaw in the user profile &amp;#34;about&amp;#34; field allows any registered user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when other users visit their channel page. The `xss_esc()` function entity-encodes input before `strip_specific_tags()` can match dangerous HTML tags, and `html_entity_decode()` on output reverses the encoding, restoring the raw malicious HTML.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Input sanitization** in `objects/user.php:156`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function setAbout($about)
{
    $this-&amp;gt;about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about));
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The call order is `strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about))`. The inner `xss_esc()` function (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:233`) calls `htmlspecialchars()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$result = @htmlspecialchars($text, ENT_QUOTES, &amp;#39;UTF-8&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This encodes `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert(1)&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;` to `&amp;amp;lt;script&amp;amp;gt;alert(1)&amp;amp;lt;/script&amp;amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then `strip_specific_tags()` (`objects/functions.php:6623-6636`) runs regex patterns to remove dangerous tags:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$string = preg_replace(&amp;#39;/&amp;lt;&amp;#39; . $tag . &amp;#39;[^&amp;gt;]*&amp;gt;(.*?)&amp;lt;\/&amp;#39; . $tag . &amp;#39;&amp;gt;/s&amp;#39;, $replacement, $string);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the regex looks for literal `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` — it can never match the entity-encoded `&amp;amp;lt;script&amp;amp;gt;`. The sanitizer is completely neutralized by the encoding that precedes it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Output** in `view/channelBody.php:239-246`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$about = html_entity_decode($user-&amp;gt;getAbout());
if (!empty($advancedCustomUser-&amp;gt;showAllAboutTextOnChannel)) {
    echo $about;
} else {
?&amp;gt;
    &amp;lt;div id=&amp;#34;aboutAreaPreCon…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sanitization order-of-operations flaw in the user profile &amp;#34;about&amp;#34; field allows any registered user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when other users visit their channel page. The `xss_esc()` function entity-encodes input before `strip_specific_tags()` can match dangerous HTML tags, and `html_entity_decode()` on output reverses the encoding, restoring the raw malicious HTML.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Input sanitization** in `objects/user.php:156`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function setAbout($about)
{
    $this-&amp;gt;about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about));
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The call order is `strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about))`. The inner `xss_esc()` function (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:233`) calls `htmlspecialchars()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$result = @htmlspecialchars($text, ENT_QUOTES, &amp;#39;UTF-8&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This encodes `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert(1)&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;` to `&amp;amp;lt;script&amp;amp;gt;alert(1)&amp;amp;lt;/script&amp;amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then `strip_specific_tags()` (`objects/functions.php:6623-6636`) runs regex patterns to remove dangerous tags:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$string = preg_replace(&amp;#39;/&amp;lt;&amp;#39; . $tag . &amp;#39;[^&amp;gt;]*&amp;gt;(.*?)&amp;lt;\/&amp;#39; . $tag . &amp;#39;&amp;gt;/s&amp;#39;, $replacement, $string);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the regex looks for literal `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` — it can never match the entity-encoded `&amp;amp;lt;script&amp;amp;gt;`. The sanitizer is completely neutralized by the encoding that precedes it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Output** in `view/channelBody.php:239-246`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$about = html_entity_decode($user-&amp;gt;getAbout());
if (!empty($advancedCustomUser-&amp;gt;showAllAboutTextOnChannel)) {
    echo $about;
} else {
?&amp;gt;
    &amp;lt;div id=&amp;#34;aboutAreaPreCon…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ghx5-7jjg-q2j7</guid>
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