https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:37:23 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277221 EUVD-2026-277221 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277221 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33679 <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue.</p> <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33679 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g9xj-752q-xh63 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>When a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the `picture` claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to `syncUserAvatarFromOpenID`, which calls `utils.DownloadImage` with the attacker-controlled URL:</p> <p>**Claim extraction** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78`): ```go type claims struct { Email string `json:&#34;email&#34;` Name string `json:&#34;name&#34;` PreferredUsername string `json:&#34;preferred_username&#34;` Nickname string `json:&#34;nickname&#34;` VikunjaGroups []map[string]interface{} `json:&#34;vikunja_groups&#34;` Picture string `json:&#34;picture&#34;` // ... } ```</p> <p>**Avatar sync trigger** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352`): ```go // Try sync avatar if available err = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture) if err != nil { log.Errorf(&#34;Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v&#34;, u.Username, err) } ```</p> <p>**Vulnerable download** (`pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115`): ```…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>When a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the `picture` claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to `syncUserAvatarFromOpenID`, which calls `utils.DownloadImage` with the attacker-controlled URL:</p> <p>**Claim extraction** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78`): ```go type claims struct { Email string `json:&#34;email&#34;` Name string `json:&#34;name&#34;` PreferredUsername string `json:&#34;preferred_username&#34;` Nickname string `json:&#34;nickname&#34;` VikunjaGroups []map[string]interface{} `json:&#34;vikunja_groups&#34;` Picture string `json:&#34;picture&#34;` // ... } ```</p> <p>**Avatar sync trigger** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352`): ```go // Try sync avatar if available err = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture) if err != nil { log.Errorf(&#34;Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v&#34;, u.Username, err) } ```</p> <p>**Vulnerable download** (`pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115`): ```…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g9xj-752q-xh63