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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:33:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277216</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277216</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277216</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277216</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33678</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33678</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, `TaskAttachment.ReadOne()` queries attachments by ID only (`WHERE id = ?`), ignoring the task ID from the URL path. The permission check in `CanRead()` validates access to the task specified in the URL, but `ReadOne()` loads a different attachment that may belong to a task in another project. This allows any authenticated user to download or delete any attachment in the system by providing their own accessible task ID with a target attachment ID. Attachment IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, `TaskAttachment.ReadOne()` queries attachments by ID only (`WHERE id = ?`), ignoring the task ID from the URL path. The permission check in `CanRead()` validates access to the task specified in the URL, but `ReadOne()` loads a different attachment that may belong to a task in another project. This allows any authenticated user to download or delete any attachment in the system by providing their own accessible task ID with a target attachment ID. Attachment IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33678</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2 — Vikjuna: IDOR in Task Attachment ReadOne Allows Cross-Project File Access and Deletion</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: code.vikunja.io/api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`TaskAttachment.ReadOne()` queries attachments by ID only (`WHERE id = ?`), ignoring the task ID from the URL path. The permission check in `CanRead()` validates access to the task specified in the URL, but `ReadOne()` loads a different attachment that may belong to a task in another project. This allows any authenticated user to download or delete any attachment in the system by providing their own accessible task ID with a target attachment ID. Attachment IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is in `pkg/models/task_attachment.go` in the `ReadOne` method:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// pkg/models/task_attachment.go:110-120
func (ta *TaskAttachment) ReadOne(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {
	exists, err := s.Where(&amp;#34;id = ?&amp;#34;, ta.ID).Get(ta)  // Only checks attachment ID, ignores TaskID
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	if !exists {
		return ErrTaskAttachmentDoesNotExist{
			TaskID:       ta.TaskID,
			AttachmentID: ta.ID,
		}
	}
	// ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The permission check in `pkg/models/task_attachment_permissions.go` validates access to the URL task, not the attachment&amp;#39;s actual task:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// pkg/models/task_attachment_permissions.go:25-28
func (ta *TaskAttachment) CanRead(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (bool, int, error) {
	t := &amp;amp;Task{ID: ta.TaskID}  // ta.TaskID is from URL param :task
	return t.CanRead(s, a)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `TaskAttachment` struct binds URL parameters via struct tags (`param:&amp;#34;task&amp;#34;` and `param:&amp;#34;attachment&amp;#34;`):
```go
// pkg/mo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: code.vikunja.io/api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`TaskAttachment.ReadOne()` queries attachments by ID only (`WHERE id = ?`), ignoring the task ID from the URL path. The permission check in `CanRead()` validates access to the task specified in the URL, but `ReadOne()` loads a different attachment that may belong to a task in another project. This allows any authenticated user to download or delete any attachment in the system by providing their own accessible task ID with a target attachment ID. Attachment IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is in `pkg/models/task_attachment.go` in the `ReadOne` method:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// pkg/models/task_attachment.go:110-120
func (ta *TaskAttachment) ReadOne(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {
	exists, err := s.Where(&amp;#34;id = ?&amp;#34;, ta.ID).Get(ta)  // Only checks attachment ID, ignores TaskID
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	if !exists {
		return ErrTaskAttachmentDoesNotExist{
			TaskID:       ta.TaskID,
			AttachmentID: ta.ID,
		}
	}
	// ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The permission check in `pkg/models/task_attachment_permissions.go` validates access to the URL task, not the attachment&amp;#39;s actual task:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// pkg/models/task_attachment_permissions.go:25-28
func (ta *TaskAttachment) CanRead(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (bool, int, error) {
	t := &amp;amp;Task{ID: ta.TaskID}  // ta.TaskID is from URL param :task
	return t.CanRead(s, a)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `TaskAttachment` struct binds URL parameters via struct tags (`param:&amp;#34;task&amp;#34;` and `param:&amp;#34;attachment&amp;#34;`):
```go
// pkg/mo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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