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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277416</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277416</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277416</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277416</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33648</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33648</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to `exec()`, allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks. Commit 99b865413172045fef6a98b5e9bfc7b24da11678 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to `exec()`, allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks. Commit 99b865413172045fef6a98b5e9bfc7b24da11678 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33648</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5m4q-5cvx-36mw — AVideo Vulnerable to OS Command Injection via Unsanitized `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in Restreamer Log…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5m4q-5cvx-36mw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to `exec()`, allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php`. The data flow is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. User input ingestion** (line 220):
```php
$request = file_get_contents(&amp;#34;php://input&amp;#34;);
$robj = json_decode($request);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Log file template** (line 58):
```php
$logFile = $logFileLocation . &amp;#34;ffmpeg_restreamer_{users_id}_&amp;#34; . date(&amp;#34;Y-m-d-h-i-s&amp;#34;) . &amp;#34;.log&amp;#34;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. `users_id` injected without sanitization** (line 318):
```php
$obj-&amp;gt;logFile = str_replace(&amp;#39;{users_id}&amp;#39;, $robj-&amp;gt;users_id, $logFile);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**4. `liveTransmitionHistory_id` injected without sanitization** (line 407):
```php
$pid[] = startRestream($m3u8, [$value], str_replace(&amp;#34;.log&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;_{$key}_{$robj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id}_{$host}.log&amp;#34;, $logFile), $robj);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: `intval()` is applied to `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in the separate `getProcess()` function (line 805), but NOT in the `runRestream()` path that constructs the log file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**5. Unsanitized log file path passed to `exec()`** (lines 720, 723):
```php
// Line 720 (remote ffmpeg path):
execFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . &amp;#39; &amp;gt; &amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to `exec()`, allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php`. The data flow is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. User input ingestion** (line 220):
```php
$request = file_get_contents(&amp;#34;php://input&amp;#34;);
$robj = json_decode($request);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Log file template** (line 58):
```php
$logFile = $logFileLocation . &amp;#34;ffmpeg_restreamer_{users_id}_&amp;#34; . date(&amp;#34;Y-m-d-h-i-s&amp;#34;) . &amp;#34;.log&amp;#34;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. `users_id` injected without sanitization** (line 318):
```php
$obj-&amp;gt;logFile = str_replace(&amp;#39;{users_id}&amp;#39;, $robj-&amp;gt;users_id, $logFile);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**4. `liveTransmitionHistory_id` injected without sanitization** (line 407):
```php
$pid[] = startRestream($m3u8, [$value], str_replace(&amp;#34;.log&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;_{$key}_{$robj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id}_{$host}.log&amp;#34;, $logFile), $robj);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: `intval()` is applied to `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in the separate `getProcess()` function (line 805), but NOT in the `runRestream()` path that constructs the log file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**5. Unsanitized log file path passed to `exec()`** (lines 720, 723):
```php
// Line 720 (remote ffmpeg path):
execFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . &amp;#39; &amp;gt; &amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5m4q-5cvx-36mw</guid>
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