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EUVD-2026-277913

fkie_cve-2026-33622

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled. `POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy. This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation. The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes. As of time of publication, a patched version is not yet available.

GHSA-w5pc-m664-r62v — A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution

Affected: Go: github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab, Go: github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab

### Summary PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled.

`POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy.

This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation.

The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes.

### Details **Issue 1 — `/evaluate` enforced the guard, `/wait` did not (`v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5`):** The dedicated evaluate endpoint rejected requests when `security.allowEvaluate` was disabled:

```go // internal/handlers/evaluate.go — v0.8.5 func (h *Handlers) evaluateEnabled() bool { return h != nil && h.Config != nil && h.Config.AllowEvaluate }

func (h *Handlers) HandleEvaluate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if !h.evaluateEnabled() { httpx.ErrorCode(w, 403, "evaluate_disabl…