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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 23:22:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276906</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276906</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276906</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276906</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33492</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33492</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, AVideo&amp;#39;s `_session_start()` function accepts arbitrary session IDs via the `PHPSESSID` GET parameter and sets them as the active PHP session. A session regeneration bypass exists for specific blacklisted endpoints when the request originates from the same domain. Combined with the explicitly disabled session regeneration in `User::login()`, this allows a classic session fixation attack where an attacker can fix a victim&amp;#39;s session ID before authentication and then hijack the authenticated session. Commit 5647a94d79bf69a972a86653fe02144079948785 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, AVideo&amp;#39;s `_session_start()` function accepts arbitrary session IDs via the `PHPSESSID` GET parameter and sets them as the active PHP session. A session regeneration bypass exists for specific blacklisted endpoints when the request originates from the same domain. Combined with the explicitly disabled session regeneration in `User::login()`, this allows a classic session fixation attack where an attacker can fix a victim&amp;#39;s session ID before authentication and then hijack the authenticated session. Commit 5647a94d79bf69a972a86653fe02144079948785 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33492</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-x3pr-vrhq-vq43 — AVideo has Session Fixation via GET PHPSESSID Parameter With Disabled Login Session Regeneration</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x3pr-vrhq-vq43</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AVideo&amp;#39;s `_session_start()` function accepts arbitrary session IDs via the `PHPSESSID` GET parameter and sets them as the active PHP session. A session regeneration bypass exists for specific blacklisted endpoints when the request originates from the same domain. Combined with the explicitly disabled session regeneration in `User::login()`, this allows a classic session fixation attack where an attacker can fix a victim&amp;#39;s session ID before authentication and then hijack the authenticated session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is a chain of three weaknesses that together enable session fixation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 1. Attacker-controlled session ID acceptance (`objects/functionsPHP.php:344-367`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
function _session_start(array $options = [])
{
    // ...
    if (isset($_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;]) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !_empty($_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;])) {
        $PHPSESSID = $_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;];
        // ...
        if (!User::isLogged()) {
            if ($PHPSESSID !== session_id()) {
                _session_write_close();
                session_id($PHPSESSID);   // &amp;lt;-- sets session to attacker&amp;#39;s ID
            }
            $session = @session_start($options);  // &amp;lt;-- starts with attacker&amp;#39;s ID
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code reads `$_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;]` and programmatically calls `session_id($PHPSESSID)`, which bypasses both `session.use_only_cookies` and `session.use_strict_mode` PHP settings since the session ID is set via the PHP API, not via cookie/URL handling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2. Session regeneration bypass for blacklisted e…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AVideo&amp;#39;s `_session_start()` function accepts arbitrary session IDs via the `PHPSESSID` GET parameter and sets them as the active PHP session. A session regeneration bypass exists for specific blacklisted endpoints when the request originates from the same domain. Combined with the explicitly disabled session regeneration in `User::login()`, this allows a classic session fixation attack where an attacker can fix a victim&amp;#39;s session ID before authentication and then hijack the authenticated session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is a chain of three weaknesses that together enable session fixation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 1. Attacker-controlled session ID acceptance (`objects/functionsPHP.php:344-367`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
function _session_start(array $options = [])
{
    // ...
    if (isset($_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;]) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !_empty($_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;])) {
        $PHPSESSID = $_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;];
        // ...
        if (!User::isLogged()) {
            if ($PHPSESSID !== session_id()) {
                _session_write_close();
                session_id($PHPSESSID);   // &amp;lt;-- sets session to attacker&amp;#39;s ID
            }
            $session = @session_start($options);  // &amp;lt;-- starts with attacker&amp;#39;s ID
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code reads `$_GET[&amp;#39;PHPSESSID&amp;#39;]` and programmatically calls `session_id($PHPSESSID)`, which bypasses both `session.use_only_cookies` and `session.use_strict_mode` PHP settings since the session ID is set via the PHP API, not via cookie/URL handling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2. Session regeneration bypass for blacklisted e…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x3pr-vrhq-vq43</guid>
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