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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 16:41:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277632</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277632</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277632</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277632</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33490</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33490</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;H3 is a minimal H(TTP) framework. In versions 2.0.0-0 through 2.0.1-rc.16, the `mount()` method in h3 uses a simple `startsWith()` check to determine whether incoming requests fall under a mounted sub-application&amp;#39;s path prefix. Because this check does not verify a path segment boundary (i.e., that the next character after the base is `/` or end-of-string), middleware registered on a mount like `/admin` will also execute for unrelated routes such as `/admin-public`, `/administrator`, or `/adminstuff`. This allows an attacker to trigger context-setting middleware on paths it was never intended to cover, potentially polluting request context with unintended privilege flags. Version 2.0.2-rc.17 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;H3 is a minimal H(TTP) framework. In versions 2.0.0-0 through 2.0.1-rc.16, the `mount()` method in h3 uses a simple `startsWith()` check to determine whether incoming requests fall under a mounted sub-application&amp;#39;s path prefix. Because this check does not verify a path segment boundary (i.e., that the next character after the base is `/` or end-of-string), middleware registered on a mount like `/admin` will also execute for unrelated routes such as `/admin-public`, `/administrator`, or `/adminstuff`. This allows an attacker to trigger context-setting middleware on paths it was never intended to cover, potentially polluting request context with unintended privilege flags. Version 2.0.2-rc.17 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33490</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2j6q-whv2-gh6w — h3: Missing Path Segment Boundary Check in `mount()` Causes Middleware Execution on Unrelated Prefix-Matching Routes</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2j6q-whv2-gh6w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: h3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `mount()` method in h3 uses a simple `startsWith()` check to determine whether incoming requests fall under a mounted sub-application&amp;#39;s path prefix. Because this check does not verify a path segment boundary (i.e., that the next character after the base is `/` or end-of-string), middleware registered on a mount like `/admin` will also execute for unrelated routes such as `/admin-public`, `/administrator`, or `/adminstuff`. This allows an attacker to trigger context-setting middleware on paths it was never intended to cover, potentially polluting request context with unintended privilege flags.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is in `src/h3.ts:127` within the `mount()` method:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
// src/h3.ts:122-135
mount(base: string, input: FetchHandler | FetchableObject | H3Type) {
  if (&amp;#34;handler&amp;#34; in input) {
    if (input[&amp;#34;~middleware&amp;#34;].length &amp;gt; 0) {
      this[&amp;#34;~middleware&amp;#34;].push((event, next) =&amp;gt; {
        const originalPathname = event.url.pathname;
        if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base)) {  // &amp;lt;-- BUG: no segment boundary check
          return next();
        }
        event.url.pathname = event.url.pathname.slice(base.length) || &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;;
        return callMiddleware(event, input[&amp;#34;~middleware&amp;#34;], () =&amp;gt; {
          event.url.pathname = originalPathname;
          return next();
        });
      });
    }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a sub-app is mounted at `/admin`, the check `originalPathname.startsWith(&amp;#34;/admin&amp;#34;)` returns `true` for `/admin`, `/admin/`, `/admin/dashboard`, b…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: h3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `mount()` method in h3 uses a simple `startsWith()` check to determine whether incoming requests fall under a mounted sub-application&amp;#39;s path prefix. Because this check does not verify a path segment boundary (i.e., that the next character after the base is `/` or end-of-string), middleware registered on a mount like `/admin` will also execute for unrelated routes such as `/admin-public`, `/administrator`, or `/adminstuff`. This allows an attacker to trigger context-setting middleware on paths it was never intended to cover, potentially polluting request context with unintended privilege flags.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is in `src/h3.ts:127` within the `mount()` method:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
// src/h3.ts:122-135
mount(base: string, input: FetchHandler | FetchableObject | H3Type) {
  if (&amp;#34;handler&amp;#34; in input) {
    if (input[&amp;#34;~middleware&amp;#34;].length &amp;gt; 0) {
      this[&amp;#34;~middleware&amp;#34;].push((event, next) =&amp;gt; {
        const originalPathname = event.url.pathname;
        if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base)) {  // &amp;lt;-- BUG: no segment boundary check
          return next();
        }
        event.url.pathname = event.url.pathname.slice(base.length) || &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;;
        return callMiddleware(event, input[&amp;#34;~middleware&amp;#34;], () =&amp;gt; {
          event.url.pathname = originalPathname;
          return next();
        });
      });
    }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a sub-app is mounted at `/admin`, the check `originalPathname.startsWith(&amp;#34;/admin&amp;#34;)` returns `true` for `/admin`, `/admin/`, `/admin/dashboard`, b…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2j6q-whv2-gh6w</guid>
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