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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 03:39:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277184</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277184</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277184</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277184</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33488</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33488</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `createKeys()` function in the LoginControl plugin&amp;#39;s PGP 2FA system generates 512-bit RSA keys, which have been publicly factorable since 1999. An attacker who obtains a target user&amp;#39;s public key can factor the 512-bit RSA modulus on commodity hardware in hours, derive the complete private key, and decrypt any PGP 2FA challenge issued by the system — completely bypassing the second authentication factor. Additionally, the `generateKeys.json.php` and `encryptMessage.json.php` endpoints lack any authentication checks, exposing CPU-intensive key generation to anonymous users. Commit 00d979d87f8182095c8150609153a43f834e351e contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `createKeys()` function in the LoginControl plugin&amp;#39;s PGP 2FA system generates 512-bit RSA keys, which have been publicly factorable since 1999. An attacker who obtains a target user&amp;#39;s public key can factor the 512-bit RSA modulus on commodity hardware in hours, derive the complete private key, and decrypt any PGP 2FA challenge issued by the system — completely bypassing the second authentication factor. Additionally, the `generateKeys.json.php` and `encryptMessage.json.php` endpoints lack any authentication checks, exposing CPU-intensive key generation to anonymous users. Commit 00d979d87f8182095c8150609153a43f834e351e contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33488</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6m5f-j7w2-w953 — AVideo has a PGP 2FA Bypass via Cryptographically Broken 512-bit RSA Key Generation in LoginControl Plugin</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6m5f-j7w2-w953</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `createKeys()` function in the LoginControl plugin&amp;#39;s PGP 2FA system generates 512-bit RSA keys, which have been publicly factorable since 1999. An attacker who obtains a target user&amp;#39;s public key can factor the 512-bit RSA modulus on commodity hardware in hours, derive the complete private key, and decrypt any PGP 2FA challenge issued by the system — completely bypassing the second authentication factor. Additionally, the `generateKeys.json.php` and `encryptMessage.json.php` endpoints lack any authentication checks, exposing CPU-intensive key generation to anonymous users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability originates in `plugin/LoginControl/pgp/functions.php` at line 26:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// plugin/LoginControl/pgp/functions.php:26
$privateKey = RSA::createKey(512);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This code was copied from the `singpolyma/openpgp-php` library&amp;#39;s example/demo code, which was never intended for production use. The entire PGP 2FA flow relies on these weak keys:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Key generation**: When a user enables PGP 2FA, the UI calls `createKeys()` which generates a 512-bit RSA keypair. The public key is saved to the database via `savePublicKey.json.php`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Challenge creation** (`LoginControl.php:520-531`): During login, a `uniqid()` token is generated, stored in the session, and encrypted with the user&amp;#39;s stored public key:
```php
// LoginControl.php:525-530
$_SESSION[&amp;#39;user&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;challenge&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;text&amp;#39;] = uniqid();
$encMessage = self::encryptPGPMessage(User::getId(), $_SESSION[&amp;#39;user&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;challenge&amp;#39;]…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `createKeys()` function in the LoginControl plugin&amp;#39;s PGP 2FA system generates 512-bit RSA keys, which have been publicly factorable since 1999. An attacker who obtains a target user&amp;#39;s public key can factor the 512-bit RSA modulus on commodity hardware in hours, derive the complete private key, and decrypt any PGP 2FA challenge issued by the system — completely bypassing the second authentication factor. Additionally, the `generateKeys.json.php` and `encryptMessage.json.php` endpoints lack any authentication checks, exposing CPU-intensive key generation to anonymous users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability originates in `plugin/LoginControl/pgp/functions.php` at line 26:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// plugin/LoginControl/pgp/functions.php:26
$privateKey = RSA::createKey(512);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This code was copied from the `singpolyma/openpgp-php` library&amp;#39;s example/demo code, which was never intended for production use. The entire PGP 2FA flow relies on these weak keys:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Key generation**: When a user enables PGP 2FA, the UI calls `createKeys()` which generates a 512-bit RSA keypair. The public key is saved to the database via `savePublicKey.json.php`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Challenge creation** (`LoginControl.php:520-531`): During login, a `uniqid()` token is generated, stored in the session, and encrypted with the user&amp;#39;s stored public key:
```php
// LoginControl.php:525-530
$_SESSION[&amp;#39;user&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;challenge&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;text&amp;#39;] = uniqid();
$encMessage = self::encryptPGPMessage(User::getId(), $_SESSION[&amp;#39;user&amp;#39;][&amp;#39;challenge&amp;#39;]…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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