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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276889</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276889</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276889</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276889</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33479</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33479</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the Gallery plugin&amp;#39;s `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;]` array values directly into PHP&amp;#39;s `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo&amp;#39;s explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution — requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page. Commit 087dab8841f8bdb54be184105ef19b47c5698fcb contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the Gallery plugin&amp;#39;s `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;]` array values directly into PHP&amp;#39;s `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo&amp;#39;s explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution — requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page. Commit 087dab8841f8bdb54be184105ef19b47c5698fcb contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33479</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh — AVideo has PHP Code Injection via eval() in Gallery saveSort.json.php Exploitable Through CSRF Against Admin</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xggw-g9pm-9qhh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Gallery plugin&amp;#39;s `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;]` array values directly into PHP&amp;#39;s `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo&amp;#39;s explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution — requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code** — `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php:20-25`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if(!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;])){
    $object = $gallery-&amp;gt;getDataObject();
    foreach ($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;] as $key =&amp;gt; $value) {
        $obj-&amp;gt;sectionsSaved[] = array($key=&amp;gt;$value);
        eval(&amp;#34;\$object-&amp;gt;{$value}Order = \$key;&amp;#34;);
    }
    $obj-&amp;gt;error = !$gallery-&amp;gt;setDataObject($object);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `$value` variable from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;]` is interpolated directly into the string passed to `eval()` with no sanitization — no allowlist, no regex validation, no escaping. Normal Gallery usage sends section names like `&amp;#39;Shorts&amp;#39;`, `&amp;#39;Trending&amp;#39;`, etc. from jQuery UI sortable, but the server enforces no such constraint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CSRF enablement** — `objects/include_config.php:134-137`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($isHTTPS) {
    ini_set(&amp;#39;session.cookie_samesite&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;None&amp;#39;);
    ini_set(&amp;#39;session.cookie_secure&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;1&amp;#39;);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The session cookie is explicitly set to `SameSite=None`, which instructs browsers t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Gallery plugin&amp;#39;s `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;]` array values directly into PHP&amp;#39;s `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo&amp;#39;s explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution — requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code** — `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php:20-25`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if(!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;])){
    $object = $gallery-&amp;gt;getDataObject();
    foreach ($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;] as $key =&amp;gt; $value) {
        $obj-&amp;gt;sectionsSaved[] = array($key=&amp;gt;$value);
        eval(&amp;#34;\$object-&amp;gt;{$value}Order = \$key;&amp;#34;);
    }
    $obj-&amp;gt;error = !$gallery-&amp;gt;setDataObject($object);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `$value` variable from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;sections&amp;#39;]` is interpolated directly into the string passed to `eval()` with no sanitization — no allowlist, no regex validation, no escaping. Normal Gallery usage sends section names like `&amp;#39;Shorts&amp;#39;`, `&amp;#39;Trending&amp;#39;`, etc. from jQuery UI sortable, but the server enforces no such constraint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CSRF enablement** — `objects/include_config.php:134-137`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($isHTTPS) {
    ini_set(&amp;#39;session.cookie_samesite&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;None&amp;#39;);
    ini_set(&amp;#39;session.cookie_secure&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;1&amp;#39;);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The session cookie is explicitly set to `SameSite=None`, which instructs browsers t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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