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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277013</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277013</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277013</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277013</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33351</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33351</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;]` parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via `file_get_contents()`. No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;]` parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via `file_get_contents()`. No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33351</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5f7v-4f6g-74rj — AVideo has Unauthenticated SSRF via `webSiteRootURL` Parameter in saveDVR.json.php, Chaining to Verification Bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5f7v-4f6g-74rj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;]` parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via `file_get_contents()`. No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`, lines 5-28&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$streamerURL = &amp;#34;&amp;#34;; // change it to your streamer URL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$configFile = &amp;#39;../../../videos/configuration.php&amp;#39;;
if (file_exists($configFile)) {
    include_once $configFile;
    $streamerURL = $global[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;];
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (empty($streamerURL) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;])) {
    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;];   // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$verifyURL = &amp;#34;{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;saveDVR&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;;
$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL);           // SSRF
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **User-controlled URL base:** When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment), `$streamerURL` is set directly from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;]` with no validation.
2. **No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction:** The value is used as-is in a `file_get_contents()` call. There is no check for `http`/`https` scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;]` parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via `file_get_contents()`. No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`, lines 5-28&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$streamerURL = &amp;#34;&amp;#34;; // change it to your streamer URL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$configFile = &amp;#39;../../../videos/configuration.php&amp;#39;;
if (file_exists($configFile)) {
    include_once $configFile;
    $streamerURL = $global[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;];
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (empty($streamerURL) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;])) {
    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;];   // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$verifyURL = &amp;#34;{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;saveDVR&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;;
$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL);           // SSRF
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **User-controlled URL base:** When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment), `$streamerURL` is set directly from `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;webSiteRootURL&amp;#39;]` with no validation.
2. **No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction:** The value is used as-is in a `file_get_contents()` call. There is no check for `http`/`https` scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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