https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 15 Oct 2026 14:22:32 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277228 EUVD-2026-277228 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277228 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33336 <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim&#39;s machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.</p> <p>## Root cause</p> <p>Two misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:</p> <p>1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).</p> <p>2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by: - `&lt;a href=&#34;https://...&#34;&gt;` links (without `target=&#34;_blank&#34;`) - `window.location` assignments - HTTP redirects - `&lt;meta http-equiv=&#34;refresh&#34;&gt;` tags</p> <p>## Attack scenario</p> <p>1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project). 2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task descr…</p> <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim&#39;s machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.</p> <p>## Root cause</p> <p>Two misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:</p> <p>1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).</p> <p>2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by: - `&lt;a href=&#34;https://...&#34;&gt;` links (without `target=&#34;_blank&#34;`) - `window.location` assignments - HTTP redirects - `&lt;meta http-equiv=&#34;refresh&#34;&gt;` tags</p> <p>## Attack scenario</p> <p>1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project). 2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task descr…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33336