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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277509</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277509</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277509</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277509</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33316</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33316</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.0, a flaw in Vikunja’s password reset logic allows disabled users to regain access to their accounts. The `ResetPassword()` function sets the user’s status to `StatusActive` after a successful password reset without verifying whether the account was previously disabled. By requesting a reset token through `/api/v1/user/password/token` and completing the reset via `/api/v1/user/password/reset`, a disabled user can reactivate their account and bypass administrator-imposed account disablement. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.0, a flaw in Vikunja’s password reset logic allows disabled users to regain access to their accounts. The `ResetPassword()` function sets the user’s status to `StatusActive` after a successful password reset without verifying whether the account was previously disabled. By requesting a reset token through `/api/v1/user/password/token` and completing the reset via `/api/v1/user/password/reset`, a disabled user can reactivate their account and bypass administrator-imposed account disablement. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33316</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vq4q-79hh-q767 — Vikunja’s Improper Access Control Enables Bypass of Administrator-Imposed Account Disablement</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vq4q-79hh-q767</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: code.vikunja.io/api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A flaw in Vikunja’s password reset logic allows disabled users to regain access to their accounts. The `ResetPassword()` function sets the user’s status to `StatusActive` after a successful password reset without verifying whether the account was previously disabled. By requesting a reset token through `/api/v1/user/password/token` and completing the reset via `/api/v1/user/password/reset`, a disabled user can reactivate their account and bypass administrator-imposed account disablement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Vulnerable Code Snippet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `pkg/user/user_password_reset.go`, beginning at line 66:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
	// Hash the password
	user.Password, err = HashPassword(reset.NewPassword)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err = removeTokens(s, user, TokenPasswordReset)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;user.Status = StatusActive // &amp;lt;--- VULNERABILITY: Unconditionally sets status to Active
	_, err = s.
		Cols(&amp;#34;password&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;status&amp;#34;).
		Where(&amp;#34;id = ?&amp;#34;, user.ID).
		Update(user)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code is vulnerable because it assumes that any user resetting their password is transitioning from a normal state or an &amp;#34;Email Confirmation Required&amp;#34; state into an &amp;#34;Active&amp;#34; state. It completely ignores whether the user was placed in the `StatusDisabled` state by an administrator.
Additionally, in the token request function (`RequestUserPasswordResetTokenByEmail`), the system fetches the user via `GetUserWithEmail()` which does **not** filter out disabled users, allowing them to legally reques…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: code.vikunja.io/api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A flaw in Vikunja’s password reset logic allows disabled users to regain access to their accounts. The `ResetPassword()` function sets the user’s status to `StatusActive` after a successful password reset without verifying whether the account was previously disabled. By requesting a reset token through `/api/v1/user/password/token` and completing the reset via `/api/v1/user/password/reset`, a disabled user can reactivate their account and bypass administrator-imposed account disablement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Vulnerable Code Snippet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `pkg/user/user_password_reset.go`, beginning at line 66:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
	// Hash the password
	user.Password, err = HashPassword(reset.NewPassword)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err = removeTokens(s, user, TokenPasswordReset)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;user.Status = StatusActive // &amp;lt;--- VULNERABILITY: Unconditionally sets status to Active
	_, err = s.
		Cols(&amp;#34;password&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;status&amp;#34;).
		Where(&amp;#34;id = ?&amp;#34;, user.ID).
		Update(user)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code is vulnerable because it assumes that any user resetting their password is transitioning from a normal state or an &amp;#34;Email Confirmation Required&amp;#34; state into an &amp;#34;Active&amp;#34; state. It completely ignores whether the user was placed in the `StatusDisabled` state by an administrator.
Additionally, in the token request function (`RequestUserPasswordResetTokenByEmail`), the system fetches the user via `GetUserWithEmail()` which does **not** filter out disabled users, allowing them to legally reques…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vq4q-79hh-q767</guid>
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