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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 14:54:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277308</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277308</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277308</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277308</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33309</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33309</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33309</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g2j9-7rj2-gm6c — Langflow has an Arbitrary File Write (RCE) via v2 API</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g2j9-7rj2-gm6c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reviewing the recent patch for **CVE-2025-68478** (External Control of File Name in v1.7.1), I discovered that the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remains unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability exists in two layers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **API Layer (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v2/files.py:162`)**: Inside the `upload_user_file` route, the `filename` is extracted directly from the multipart `Content-Disposition` header (`new_filename = file.filename`). It is passed verbatim to the storage service. `ValidatedFileName` provides zero protection here as it only guards URL path parameters.
2. **Storage Layer (`src/backend/base/langflow/services/storage/local.py:114-116`)**: The `LocalStorageService` uses naive path concatenation (`file_path = folder_path / file_name`). It lacks a `resolve().is_relative_to(base_dir)` containment check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Recommended Fix:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Sanitize the multipart filename before processing:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
from pathlib import Path as StdPath
new_filename = StdPath(file.filename or &amp;#34;&amp;#34;).name # Strips direct…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reviewing the recent patch for **CVE-2025-68478** (External Control of File Name in v1.7.1), I discovered that the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remains unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability exists in two layers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **API Layer (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v2/files.py:162`)**: Inside the `upload_user_file` route, the `filename` is extracted directly from the multipart `Content-Disposition` header (`new_filename = file.filename`). It is passed verbatim to the storage service. `ValidatedFileName` provides zero protection here as it only guards URL path parameters.
2. **Storage Layer (`src/backend/base/langflow/services/storage/local.py:114-116`)**: The `LocalStorageService` uses naive path concatenation (`file_path = folder_path / file_name`). It lacks a `resolve().is_relative_to(base_dir)` containment check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Recommended Fix:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Sanitize the multipart filename before processing:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
from pathlib import Path as StdPath
new_filename = StdPath(file.filename or &amp;#34;&amp;#34;).name # Strips direct…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g2j9-7rj2-gm6c</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-79</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-79</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-79</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-0804 — Langflow: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Codeausführung</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0804</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Langflow ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Langflow ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0804</guid>
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