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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277366</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277366</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277366</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277366</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33294</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33294</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the BulkEmbed plugin&amp;#39;s save endpoint (`plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php`) fetches user-supplied thumbnail URLs via `url_get_contents()` without SSRF protection. Unlike all six other URL-fetching endpoints in AVideo that were hardened with `isSSRFSafeURL()`, this code path was missed. An authenticated attacker can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal network resources and retrieve the responses by viewing the saved video thumbnail. Version 26.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the BulkEmbed plugin&amp;#39;s save endpoint (`plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php`) fetches user-supplied thumbnail URLs via `url_get_contents()` without SSRF protection. Unlike all six other URL-fetching endpoints in AVideo that were hardened with `isSSRFSafeURL()`, this code path was missed. An authenticated attacker can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal network resources and retrieve the responses by viewing the saved video thumbnail. Version 26.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-66cw-h2mj-j39p — AVideo Affected by SSRF in BulkEmbed Thumbnail Fetch Allows Reading Internal Network Resources</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-66cw-h2mj-j39p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BulkEmbed plugin&amp;#39;s save endpoint (`plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php`) fetches user-supplied thumbnail URLs via `url_get_contents()` without SSRF protection. Unlike all six other URL-fetching endpoints in AVideo that were hardened with `isSSRFSafeURL()`, this code path was missed. An authenticated attacker can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal network resources and retrieve the responses by viewing the saved video thumbnail.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When saving bulk-embedded videos, user-supplied thumbnail URLs from `$_POST[&amp;#39;itemsToSave&amp;#39;][x][&amp;#39;thumbs&amp;#39;]` flow directly into `url_get_contents()` with no SSRF validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php:68-105`**
```php
foreach ($_POST[&amp;#39;itemsToSave&amp;#39;] as $value) {
    foreach ($value as $key =&amp;gt; $value2) {
        $value[$key] = xss_esc($value2);  // HTML entity encoding — irrelevant for SSRF
    }
    // ...
    $poster = Video::getPathToFile(&amp;#34;{$paths[&amp;#39;filename&amp;#39;]}.jpg&amp;#34;);
    $thumbs = $value[&amp;#39;thumbs&amp;#39;];              // ← attacker-controlled URL
    if (!empty($thumbs)) {
        $contentThumbs = url_get_contents($thumbs);  // ← fetched without SSRF check
        if (!empty($contentThumbs)) {
            make_path($poster);
            $bytes = file_put_contents($poster, $contentThumbs);  // ← response saved to disk
        }
    }
    // ...
    $videos-&amp;gt;setStatus(&amp;#39;a&amp;#39;);  // ← video set to active, thumbnail publicly accessible
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `url_get_contents()` function internally calls `isValidURLOrPath()` which only…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BulkEmbed plugin&amp;#39;s save endpoint (`plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php`) fetches user-supplied thumbnail URLs via `url_get_contents()` without SSRF protection. Unlike all six other URL-fetching endpoints in AVideo that were hardened with `isSSRFSafeURL()`, this code path was missed. An authenticated attacker can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal network resources and retrieve the responses by viewing the saved video thumbnail.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When saving bulk-embedded videos, user-supplied thumbnail URLs from `$_POST[&amp;#39;itemsToSave&amp;#39;][x][&amp;#39;thumbs&amp;#39;]` flow directly into `url_get_contents()` with no SSRF validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php:68-105`**
```php
foreach ($_POST[&amp;#39;itemsToSave&amp;#39;] as $value) {
    foreach ($value as $key =&amp;gt; $value2) {
        $value[$key] = xss_esc($value2);  // HTML entity encoding — irrelevant for SSRF
    }
    // ...
    $poster = Video::getPathToFile(&amp;#34;{$paths[&amp;#39;filename&amp;#39;]}.jpg&amp;#34;);
    $thumbs = $value[&amp;#39;thumbs&amp;#39;];              // ← attacker-controlled URL
    if (!empty($thumbs)) {
        $contentThumbs = url_get_contents($thumbs);  // ← fetched without SSRF check
        if (!empty($contentThumbs)) {
            make_path($poster);
            $bytes = file_put_contents($poster, $contentThumbs);  // ← response saved to disk
        }
    }
    // ...
    $videos-&amp;gt;setStatus(&amp;#39;a&amp;#39;);  // ← video set to active, thumbnail publicly accessible
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `url_get_contents()` function internally calls `isValidURLOrPath()` which only…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-66cw-h2mj-j39p</guid>
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