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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277230</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277230</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277230</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277230</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33293</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33293</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the `deleteDump` parameter in `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php` is passed directly to `unlink()` without any path sanitization. An attacker with valid clone credentials can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../`) to delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical application files such as `configuration.php`, causing complete denial of service or enabling further attacks by removing security-critical files. Version 26.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the `deleteDump` parameter in `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php` is passed directly to `unlink()` without any path sanitization. An attacker with valid clone credentials can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../`) to delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical application files such as `configuration.php`, causing complete denial of service or enabling further attacks by removing security-critical files. Version 26.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33293</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xmjm-86qv-g226 — AVideo Affected by Arbitrary File Deletion via Path Traversal in CloneSite deleteDump Parameter</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xmjm-86qv-g226</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `deleteDump` parameter in `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php` is passed directly to `unlink()` without any path sanitization. An attacker with valid clone credentials can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../`) to delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical application files such as `configuration.php`, causing complete denial of service or enabling further attacks by removing security-critical files.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php`, the `$clonesDir` variable is set to the application&amp;#39;s storage path appended with `clones/` (line 11). When a `deleteDump` GET parameter is provided, its value is concatenated directly into a path passed to `unlink()` with no validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:10-11
$videosDir = Video::getStoragePath() . &amp;#34;&amp;#34;;
$clonesDir = &amp;#34;{$videosDir}clones/&amp;#34;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:44-46
if (!empty($_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;])) {
    $resp-&amp;gt;error = !unlink(&amp;#34;{$clonesDir}{$_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;);
    $resp-&amp;gt;msg = &amp;#34;Delete Dump {$_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;;
    die(json_encode($resp));
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The intended functionality is to delete SQL dump files generated during the clone process (named via `uniqid()` at line 58). However, because `$_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;]` is never passed through `basename()`, `realpath()`, or any other path normalization function, an attacker can supply directory traversal sequences to escape the `$clonesDir` directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given a typical `$clonesDir`…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `deleteDump` parameter in `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php` is passed directly to `unlink()` without any path sanitization. An attacker with valid clone credentials can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../`) to delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical application files such as `configuration.php`, causing complete denial of service or enabling further attacks by removing security-critical files.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php`, the `$clonesDir` variable is set to the application&amp;#39;s storage path appended with `clones/` (line 11). When a `deleteDump` GET parameter is provided, its value is concatenated directly into a path passed to `unlink()` with no validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:10-11
$videosDir = Video::getStoragePath() . &amp;#34;&amp;#34;;
$clonesDir = &amp;#34;{$videosDir}clones/&amp;#34;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:44-46
if (!empty($_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;])) {
    $resp-&amp;gt;error = !unlink(&amp;#34;{$clonesDir}{$_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;);
    $resp-&amp;gt;msg = &amp;#34;Delete Dump {$_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;;
    die(json_encode($resp));
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The intended functionality is to delete SQL dump files generated during the clone process (named via `uniqid()` at line 58). However, because `$_GET[&amp;#39;deleteDump&amp;#39;]` is never passed through `basename()`, `realpath()`, or any other path normalization function, an attacker can supply directory traversal sequences to escape the `$clonesDir` directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given a typical `$clonesDir`…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xmjm-86qv-g226</guid>
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