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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 15:13:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277471</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277471</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277471</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277471</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33241</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33241</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Salvo is a Rust web framework. Prior to version 0.89.3, Salvo&amp;#39;s form data parsing implementations (`form_data()` method and `Extractible` macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service. Version 0.89.3 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Salvo is a Rust web framework. Prior to version 0.89.3, Salvo&amp;#39;s form data parsing implementations (`form_data()` method and `Extractible` macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service. Version 0.89.3 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33241</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x — Salvo Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Memory Allocation in Form Data Parsing</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: salvo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Salvo&amp;#39;s form data parsing implementations (`form_data()` method and `Extractible` macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
### Vulnerability Description
Three attack vectors exist in Salvo&amp;#39;s form handling:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **URL-encoded form data** (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`)
   - `Request::form_data()` calls `BodyExt::collect(body)` which reads the entire body into memory without size checking
   - Affects handlers using `req.form_data().await` directly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Multipart form data** (`multipart/form-data`)
   - Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing
   - Affects handlers processing multipart uploads&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. **Extractible macro**
   - `#[derive(Extractible)]` with `#[salvo(extract(default_source(from = &amp;#34;body&amp;#34;)))]` internally calls `form_data()`
   - Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause
The `FormData::read()` implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when `Request::payload_with_max_size()` is available, it&amp;#39;s not automatically applied in the form parsing path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
1. run `Extract data from request` example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.
2. Send `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` OR `multipart/form-data` payload to the endp…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: salvo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Salvo&amp;#39;s form data parsing implementations (`form_data()` method and `Extractible` macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
### Vulnerability Description
Three attack vectors exist in Salvo&amp;#39;s form handling:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **URL-encoded form data** (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`)
   - `Request::form_data()` calls `BodyExt::collect(body)` which reads the entire body into memory without size checking
   - Affects handlers using `req.form_data().await` directly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Multipart form data** (`multipart/form-data`)
   - Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing
   - Affects handlers processing multipart uploads&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. **Extractible macro**
   - `#[derive(Extractible)]` with `#[salvo(extract(default_source(from = &amp;#34;body&amp;#34;)))]` internally calls `form_data()`
   - Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause
The `FormData::read()` implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when `Request::payload_with_max_size()` is available, it&amp;#39;s not automatically applied in the form parsing path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
1. run `Extract data from request` example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.
2. Send `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` OR `multipart/form-data` payload to the endp…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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