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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:52:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277063</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277063</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277063</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277063</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33143</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33143</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to version 10.0.34, the WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks. This issue has been patched in version 10.0.34.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to version 10.0.34, the WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks. This issue has been patched in version 10.0.34.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33143</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc — OneUptime WhatsApp Webhook Missing Signature Verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g5ph-f57v-mwjc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: oneuptime&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WhatsApp POST webhook handler (`/notification/whatsapp/webhook`) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code — `App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts` lines 372-430:**
```typescript
router.post(
  &amp;#34;/webhook&amp;#34;,
  async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) =&amp;gt; {
    try {
      const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;
      // NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (
        (body[&amp;#34;object&amp;#34;] as string | undefined) !== &amp;#34;whatsapp_business_account&amp;#34;
      ) {
        return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
      }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body[&amp;#34;entry&amp;#34;] as JSONArray | undefined;
      // ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts` line 58:**
```typescript
const isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(
    Buffer.from(computedSignature),
    Buffer.from(slackSignature)
);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token — only the POST handler (which processes actual event…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: oneuptime&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WhatsApp POST webhook handler (`/notification/whatsapp/webhook`) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code — `App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts` lines 372-430:**
```typescript
router.post(
  &amp;#34;/webhook&amp;#34;,
  async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) =&amp;gt; {
    try {
      const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;
      // NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (
        (body[&amp;#34;object&amp;#34;] as string | undefined) !== &amp;#34;whatsapp_business_account&amp;#34;
      ) {
        return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
      }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body[&amp;#34;entry&amp;#34;] as JSONArray | undefined;
      // ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts` line 58:**
```typescript
const isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(
    Buffer.from(computedSignature),
    Buffer.from(slackSignature)
);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token — only the POST handler (which processes actual event…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g5ph-f57v-mwjc</guid>
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