https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 11:06:20 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277353 EUVD-2026-277353 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277353 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33142 <p>OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to version 10.0.34, the fix for CVE-2026-32306 (ClickHouse SQL injection via aggregate query parameters) added column name validation to the _aggregateBy method but did not apply the same validation to three other query construction paths in StatementGenerator. The toSortStatement, toSelectStatement, and toGroupByStatement methods accept user-controlled object keys from API request bodies and interpolate them as ClickHouse Identifier parameters without verifying they correspond to actual model columns. ClickHouse Identifier parameters are substituted directly into queries without escaping, so an attacker who can reach any analytics list or aggregate endpoint can inject arbitrary SQL through crafted sort, select, or groupBy keys. This issue has been patched in version 10.0.34.</p> <p>OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to version 10.0.34, the fix for CVE-2026-32306 (ClickHouse SQL injection via aggregate query parameters) added column name validation to the _aggregateBy method but did not apply the same validation to three other query construction paths in StatementGenerator. The toSortStatement, toSelectStatement, and toGroupByStatement methods accept user-controlled object keys from API request bodies and interpolate them as ClickHouse Identifier parameters without verifying they correspond to actual model columns. ClickHouse Identifier parameters are substituted directly into queries without escaping, so an attacker who can reach any analytics list or aggregate endpoint can inject arbitrary SQL through crafted sort, select, or groupBy keys. This issue has been patched in version 10.0.34.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33142 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: oneuptime</p> <p>The fix for GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35 (ClickHouse SQL injection via aggregate query parameters) added column name validation to the `_aggregateBy` method but did not apply the same validation to three other query construction paths in `StatementGenerator`. The `toSortStatement`, `toSelectStatement`, and `toGroupByStatement` methods accept user-controlled object keys from API request bodies and interpolate them as ClickHouse `Identifier` parameters without verifying they correspond to actual model columns.</p> <p>ClickHouse Identifier parameters are substituted directly into queries without escaping, so an attacker who can reach any analytics list or aggregate endpoint can inject arbitrary SQL through crafted `sort`, `select`, or `groupBy` keys.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>### Root cause</p> <p>`StatementGenerator.ts` has four methods that iterate over user-provided object keys to build SQL:</p> <p>| Method | Validates keys? | |--------|----------------| | `toWhereStatement` (line 292) | Yes - calls `this.model.getTableColumn(key)` | | `toSortStatement` (line 467) | **No** | | `toSelectStatement` (line 483) | **No** | | `toGroupByStatement` (line 451) | **No** |</p> <p>In `Statement.ts`, when a value passed to the `SQL` tagged template is a string, it receives the `Identifier` data type (line 40). Per [ClickHouse documentation](https://clickhouse.com/docs/en/sql-reference/syntax#defining-and-using-query-parameters), Identifier parameters are substituted directly into the query without quoting or escaping. This is correc…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: oneuptime</p> <p>The fix for GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35 (ClickHouse SQL injection via aggregate query parameters) added column name validation to the `_aggregateBy` method but did not apply the same validation to three other query construction paths in `StatementGenerator`. The `toSortStatement`, `toSelectStatement`, and `toGroupByStatement` methods accept user-controlled object keys from API request bodies and interpolate them as ClickHouse `Identifier` parameters without verifying they correspond to actual model columns.</p> <p>ClickHouse Identifier parameters are substituted directly into queries without escaping, so an attacker who can reach any analytics list or aggregate endpoint can inject arbitrary SQL through crafted `sort`, `select`, or `groupBy` keys.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>### Root cause</p> <p>`StatementGenerator.ts` has four methods that iterate over user-provided object keys to build SQL:</p> <p>| Method | Validates keys? | |--------|----------------| | `toWhereStatement` (line 292) | Yes - calls `this.model.getTableColumn(key)` | | `toSortStatement` (line 467) | **No** | | `toSelectStatement` (line 483) | **No** | | `toGroupByStatement` (line 451) | **No** |</p> <p>In `Statement.ts`, when a value passed to the `SQL` tagged template is a string, it receives the `Identifier` data type (line 40). Per [ClickHouse documentation](https://clickhouse.com/docs/en/sql-reference/syntax#defining-and-using-query-parameters), Identifier parameters are substituted directly into the query without quoting or escaping. This is correc…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg