<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 02:44:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276785</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276785</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276785</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276785</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33081</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33081</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. Versions 0.8.2 and below have a Blind SSRF vulnerability in the /download endpoint. The validateDownloadURL() function only checks the initial user-supplied URL, but the embedded Chromium browser can follow attacker-controlled redirects/navigations to internal network addresses after validation. Exploitation requires security.allowDownload=true (disabled by default), limiting real-world impact. An attacker-controlled page can use JavaScript redirects or resource requests to make the browser reach internal services from the PinchTab host, resulting in a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) condition against internal-only services. The issue has been patched in version 0.8.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. Versions 0.8.2 and below have a Blind SSRF vulnerability in the /download endpoint. The validateDownloadURL() function only checks the initial user-supplied URL, but the embedded Chromium browser can follow attacker-controlled redirects/navigations to internal network addresses after validation. Exploitation requires security.allowDownload=true (disabled by default), limiting real-world impact. An attacker-controlled page can use JavaScript redirects or resource requests to make the browser reach internal services from the PinchTab host, resulting in a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) condition against internal-only services. The issue has been patched in version 0.8.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33081</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qwxp-6qf9-wr4m — PinchTab has a Blind SSRF via browser-side redirect bypass in /download URL validation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qwxp-6qf9-wr4m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### **The /download endpoint validates only the initial URL provided by the user using validateDownloadURL() to prevent requests to internal or private network addresses.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires \security.allowDownload=true`, which is disabled by default.`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, pages loaded by the embedded Chromium browser can trigger additional browser-side requests (for example, JavaScript redirects, navigations, or resource requests) after the initial validation step.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the validation is only applied to the initial URL and not to subsequent browser-issued request targets, an attacker-controlled page can cause the browser to issue requests to internal network services reachable from the PinchTab host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) condition in which internal-only services may be accessed and state-changing endpoints may be triggered without returning the response body to the attacker.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### **Steps to Reproduce:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Environment Setup**
Target: PinchTab server (tested on v0.8.x, v0.7.x)
Attacker-controlled server: Publicly accessible (e.g., via ngrok) [attacker.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26013554/att.py)
Internal service: Runs on the same host as PinchTab and is not externally accessible [internal_service.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26013551/internal.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Start a Local Internal Service (Victim Side)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Run a simple HTTP service bound to localhost: [internal_service.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/f…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### **The /download endpoint validates only the initial URL provided by the user using validateDownloadURL() to prevent requests to internal or private network addresses.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires \security.allowDownload=true`, which is disabled by default.`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, pages loaded by the embedded Chromium browser can trigger additional browser-side requests (for example, JavaScript redirects, navigations, or resource requests) after the initial validation step.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the validation is only applied to the initial URL and not to subsequent browser-issued request targets, an attacker-controlled page can cause the browser to issue requests to internal network services reachable from the PinchTab host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) condition in which internal-only services may be accessed and state-changing endpoints may be triggered without returning the response body to the attacker.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### **Steps to Reproduce:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Environment Setup**
Target: PinchTab server (tested on v0.8.x, v0.7.x)
Attacker-controlled server: Publicly accessible (e.g., via ngrok) [attacker.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26013554/att.py)
Internal service: Runs on the same host as PinchTab and is not externally accessible [internal_service.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26013551/internal.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Start a Local Internal Service (Victim Side)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Run a simple HTTP service bound to localhost: [internal_service.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/f…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qwxp-6qf9-wr4m</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
