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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-276634</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276634</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276634</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276634</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33068</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33068</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Versions prior to 2.1.53 resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled .claude/settings.json, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set permissions.defaultMode to bypassPermissions in its committed .claude/settings.json, causing the trust dialog to be silently skipped on first open. This allowed a user to be placed into a permissive mode without seeing the trust confirmation prompt, making it easier for an attacker-controlled repository to gain tool execution without explicit user consent. This issue has been patched in version 2.1.53.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Versions prior to 2.1.53 resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled .claude/settings.json, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set permissions.defaultMode to bypassPermissions in its committed .claude/settings.json, causing the trust dialog to be silently skipped on first open. This allowed a user to be placed into a permissive mode without seeing the trust confirmation prompt, making it easier for an attacker-controlled repository to gain tool execution without explicit user consent. This issue has been patched in version 2.1.53.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33068</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mmgp-wc2j-qcv7 — Claude Code has a Workspace Trust Dialog Bypass via Repo-Controlled Settings File</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mmgp-wc2j-qcv7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @anthropic-ai/claude-code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled `.claude/settings.json`, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set `permissions.defaultMode` to `bypassPermissions` in its committed `.claude/settings.json`, causing the trust dialog to be silently skipped on first open. This allowed a user to be placed into a permissive mode without seeing the trust confirmation prompt, making it easier for an attacker-controlled repository to gain tool execution without explicit user consent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thank you to hackerone.com/cantina_xyz for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @anthropic-ai/claude-code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled `.claude/settings.json`, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set `permissions.defaultMode` to `bypassPermissions` in its committed `.claude/settings.json`, causing the trust dialog to be silently skipped on first open. This allowed a user to be placed into a permissive mode without seeing the trust confirmation prompt, making it easier for an attacker-controlled repository to gain tool execution without explicit user consent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thank you to hackerone.com/cantina_xyz for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mmgp-wc2j-qcv7</guid>
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