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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 08:17:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276770</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276770</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276770</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276770</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32881</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32881</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ewe is a Gleam web server. ewe is a Gleam web server. Versions 0.6.0 through 3.0.4 are vulnerable to authentication bypass or spoofed proxy-trust headers. Chunked transfer encoding trailer handling merges declared trailer fields into req.headers after body parsing, but the denylist only blocks 9 header names.  A malicious client can exploit this by declaring these headers in the Trailer field and appending them after the final chunk, causing request.set_header to overwrite legitimate values (e.g., those set by a reverse proxy). This enables attackers to forge authentication credentials, hijack sessions, bypass IP-based rate limiting, or spoof proxy-trust headers in any downstream middleware that reads headers after ewe.read_body is called. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ewe is a Gleam web server. ewe is a Gleam web server. Versions 0.6.0 through 3.0.4 are vulnerable to authentication bypass or spoofed proxy-trust headers. Chunked transfer encoding trailer handling merges declared trailer fields into req.headers after body parsing, but the denylist only blocks 9 header names.  A malicious client can exploit this by declaring these headers in the Trailer field and appending them after the final chunk, causing request.set_header to overwrite legitimate values (e.g., those set by a reverse proxy). This enables attackers to forge authentication credentials, hijack sessions, bypass IP-based rate limiting, or spoof proxy-trust headers in any downstream middleware that reads headers after ewe.read_body is called. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32881</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9w88-79f8-m3vp — Permissive List of Allowed Inputs in ewe</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9w88-79f8-m3vp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Hex: ewe&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ewe&amp;#39;s chunked transfer encoding trailer handling merges declared trailer fields into `req.headers` after body parsing, but the denylist only blocks 9 header names. Security-sensitive headers like `authorization`, `cookie`, and `x-forwarded-for` can be injected or overwritten by a malicious client via trailers, potentially bypassing authentication or spoofing proxy-trust headers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `ewe.read_body` processes a chunked request with a `Trailer` header, it calls `handle_trailers` (`ewe/internal/http1.gleam:493`), which merges declared trailer fields into `req.headers` via `request.set_header` (line 517). The `is_forbidden_trailer` denylist (line 534) only blocks 9 header names: `transfer-encoding`, `content-length`, `host`, `cache-control`, `expect`, `max-forwards`, `pragma`, `range`, and `te`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security-sensitive headers are not blocked, including:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `authorization` — attacker can inject or overwrite Bearer tokens
- `cookie` / `set-cookie` — attacker can inject session cookies
- `proxy-authorization` — attacker can inject proxy credentials
- `x-forwarded-for`, `x-forwarded-host`, `x-forwarded-proto` — attacker can spoof proxy-trust headers
- `x-real-ip` — attacker can spoof client IP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious client can inject these headers by declaring them in the `Trailer` request header and including them after the final `0\r\n` chunk. If the header already exists (e.g., set by a reverse proxy), `request.set_header` overwrites it. Any application logic that rea…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Hex: ewe&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ewe&amp;#39;s chunked transfer encoding trailer handling merges declared trailer fields into `req.headers` after body parsing, but the denylist only blocks 9 header names. Security-sensitive headers like `authorization`, `cookie`, and `x-forwarded-for` can be injected or overwritten by a malicious client via trailers, potentially bypassing authentication or spoofing proxy-trust headers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `ewe.read_body` processes a chunked request with a `Trailer` header, it calls `handle_trailers` (`ewe/internal/http1.gleam:493`), which merges declared trailer fields into `req.headers` via `request.set_header` (line 517). The `is_forbidden_trailer` denylist (line 534) only blocks 9 header names: `transfer-encoding`, `content-length`, `host`, `cache-control`, `expect`, `max-forwards`, `pragma`, `range`, and `te`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security-sensitive headers are not blocked, including:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `authorization` — attacker can inject or overwrite Bearer tokens
- `cookie` / `set-cookie` — attacker can inject session cookies
- `proxy-authorization` — attacker can inject proxy credentials
- `x-forwarded-for`, `x-forwarded-host`, `x-forwarded-proto` — attacker can spoof proxy-trust headers
- `x-real-ip` — attacker can spoof client IP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious client can inject these headers by declaring them in the `Trailer` request header and including them after the final `0\r\n` chunk. If the header already exists (e.g., set by a reverse proxy), `request.set_header` overwrites it. Any application logic that rea…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9w88-79f8-m3vp</guid>
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