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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277179</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277179</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277179</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277179</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32879</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32879</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Starting in version 0.10.0, a logic flaw in the universal secure verification flow allows an authenticated user with a registered passkey to satisfy secure verification without completing a WebAuthn assertion. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available. Until a patched release is applied, do not rely on passkey as the step-up method for privileged secure-verification actions; require TOTP/2FA for those actions where operationally possible; or temporarily restrict access to affected secure-verification-protected endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Starting in version 0.10.0, a logic flaw in the universal secure verification flow allows an authenticated user with a registered passkey to satisfy secure verification without completing a WebAuthn assertion. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available. Until a patched release is applied, do not rely on passkey as the step-up method for privileged secure-verification actions; require TOTP/2FA for those actions where operationally possible; or temporarily restrict access to affected secure-verification-protected endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32879</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5353-f8fq-65vc — New API has passkey-based secure step-up verification bypass for root-only channel secret disclosure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5353-f8fq-65vc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A logic flaw in the universal secure verification flow allows an authenticated user with a registered passkey to satisfy secure verification without completing a WebAuthn assertion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt;= v0.10.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `POST /api/verify` endpoint supports multiple secure verification methods, including passkeys. When the request body contains `{&amp;#34;method&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;passkey&amp;#34;}`, the server only checks whether the authenticated account has a passkey record on file and then marks the secure verification session as complete. It does not verify that the requester successfully completed a WebAuthn assertion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an authenticated user who already has a valid session and a registered passkey can satisfy the secure verification requirement without performing the intended passkey challenge/response flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the upstream project, this issue affects actions protected by `SecureVerificationRequired()`. At the time of publication, the confirmed upstream impact is the root-only `POST /api/channel/:id/key` endpoint, which returns stored channel secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Successful exploitation requires:
- an already authenticated session for the target account, and
- a registered passkey on that account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No full login bypass or cross-account privilege escalation has been confirmed in the upstream codebase. However, the issue defeats the intended step-up verification control for affected privileged actions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Until a patched release is applied:
- do no…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A logic flaw in the universal secure verification flow allows an authenticated user with a registered passkey to satisfy secure verification without completing a WebAuthn assertion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt;= v0.10.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `POST /api/verify` endpoint supports multiple secure verification methods, including passkeys. When the request body contains `{&amp;#34;method&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;passkey&amp;#34;}`, the server only checks whether the authenticated account has a passkey record on file and then marks the secure verification session as complete. It does not verify that the requester successfully completed a WebAuthn assertion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an authenticated user who already has a valid session and a registered passkey can satisfy the secure verification requirement without performing the intended passkey challenge/response flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the upstream project, this issue affects actions protected by `SecureVerificationRequired()`. At the time of publication, the confirmed upstream impact is the root-only `POST /api/channel/:id/key` endpoint, which returns stored channel secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Successful exploitation requires:
- an already authenticated session for the target account, and
- a registered passkey on that account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No full login bypass or cross-account privilege escalation has been confirmed in the upstream codebase. However, the issue defeats the intended step-up verification control for affected privileged actions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Until a patched release is applied:
- do no…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5353-f8fq-65vc</guid>
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