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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 17:35:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276782</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276782</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276782</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276782</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32815</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32815</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the WebSocket endpoint (/ws) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (?app=siyuan&amp;amp;id=auth&amp;amp;type=auth). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users. Combined with the absence of Origin header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim&amp;#39;s local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the WebSocket endpoint (/ws) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (?app=siyuan&amp;amp;id=auth&amp;amp;type=auth). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users. Combined with the absence of Origin header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim&amp;#39;s local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32815</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xp2m-98x8-rpj6 — SiYuan Vulnerable to Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xp2m-98x8-rpj6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan&amp;#39;s WebSocket endpoint (`/ws`) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (`?app=siyuan&amp;amp;id=auth&amp;amp;type=auth`). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Combined with the absence of `Origin` header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim&amp;#39;s local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **File:** `kernel/server/serve.go:728-731`
- **Function:** `serveWebSocket()` → `HandleConnect` handler
- **Endpoint:** `GET /ws?app=siyuan&amp;amp;id=auth&amp;amp;type=auth` (unauthenticated)
- **Version:** SiYuan &amp;lt;= 3.5.9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WebSocket `HandleConnect` handler has a special case bypass (line 730) intended for the authorization page:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) {
    authOk := true
    if &amp;#34;&amp;#34; != model.Conf.AccessAuthCode {
        // ... normal session/JWT authentication checks ...
        // authOk = false if no valid session
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if !authOk {
        // Bypass: allow connection for auth page keepalive…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan&amp;#39;s WebSocket endpoint (`/ws`) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (`?app=siyuan&amp;amp;id=auth&amp;amp;type=auth`). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Combined with the absence of `Origin` header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim&amp;#39;s local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **File:** `kernel/server/serve.go:728-731`
- **Function:** `serveWebSocket()` → `HandleConnect` handler
- **Endpoint:** `GET /ws?app=siyuan&amp;amp;id=auth&amp;amp;type=auth` (unauthenticated)
- **Version:** SiYuan &amp;lt;= 3.5.9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WebSocket `HandleConnect` handler has a special case bypass (line 730) intended for the authorization page:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) {
    authOk := true
    if &amp;#34;&amp;#34; != model.Conf.AccessAuthCode {
        // ... normal session/JWT authentication checks ...
        // authOk = false if no valid session
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if !authOk {
        // Bypass: allow connection for auth page keepalive…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xp2m-98x8-rpj6</guid>
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