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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276678</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276678</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276678</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276678</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32768</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32768</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Chall-Manager is a platform-agnostic system able to start Challenges on Demand of a player. In versions prior to 0.6.5, due to a miswritten NetworkPolicy, a malicious actor can pivot from an instance to any Pod out of the origin namespace. This breaks the security-by-default property expected as part of the deployment program, leading to a potential lateral movement. In the specific case of sdk/kubernetes.Kompose it does not isolate the instances. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Chall-Manager is a platform-agnostic system able to start Challenges on Demand of a player. In versions prior to 0.6.5, due to a miswritten NetworkPolicy, a malicious actor can pivot from an instance to any Pod out of the origin namespace. This breaks the security-by-default property expected as part of the deployment program, leading to a potential lateral movement. In the specific case of sdk/kubernetes.Kompose it does not isolate the instances. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32768</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mw24-f3xh-j3qv — Chall-Manager's invalid NetworkPolicy enables a malicious actor to pivot into another namespace</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mw24-f3xh-j3qv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/deploy, Go: github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Due to a mis-written NetworkPolicy, a malicious actor can pivot from an instance to any Pod out of the origin namespace.
This breaks the security-by-default property expected as part of the deployment program, leading to a potential lateral movement.
In the specific case of `sdk/kubernetes.Kompose` it does not isolate the instances.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Removing the `inter-ns` NetworkPolicy patches the vulnerability. If updates are not possible in production environments, we recommend to manually delete it and update as soon as possible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given your context, delete the failing network policy that should be prefixed by `inter-ns-` in the target namespace.
You can use the following to delete all matching network policy. If unsure of the outcome, please do it manually.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
for ns in $(kubectl get ns -o jsonpath=&amp;#39;{.items[*].metadata.name}&amp;#39; | tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39; | grep &amp;#39;^cm-target-&amp;#39;); do
  kubectl -n &amp;#34;$ns&amp;#34; get networkpolicy -o name \
  | grep &amp;#39;^networkpolicy.networking.k8s.io/inter-ns-&amp;#39; \
  | xargs -r kubectl -n &amp;#34;$ns&amp;#34; delete
done
```&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/deploy, Go: github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Due to a mis-written NetworkPolicy, a malicious actor can pivot from an instance to any Pod out of the origin namespace.
This breaks the security-by-default property expected as part of the deployment program, leading to a potential lateral movement.
In the specific case of `sdk/kubernetes.Kompose` it does not isolate the instances.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Removing the `inter-ns` NetworkPolicy patches the vulnerability. If updates are not possible in production environments, we recommend to manually delete it and update as soon as possible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given your context, delete the failing network policy that should be prefixed by `inter-ns-` in the target namespace.
You can use the following to delete all matching network policy. If unsure of the outcome, please do it manually.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
for ns in $(kubectl get ns -o jsonpath=&amp;#39;{.items[*].metadata.name}&amp;#39; | tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39; | grep &amp;#39;^cm-target-&amp;#39;); do
  kubectl -n &amp;#34;$ns&amp;#34; get networkpolicy -o name \
  | grep &amp;#39;^networkpolicy.networking.k8s.io/inter-ns-&amp;#39; \
  | xargs -r kubectl -n &amp;#34;$ns&amp;#34; delete
done
```&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mw24-f3xh-j3qv</guid>
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