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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277054</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277054</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277054</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277054</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32751</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32751</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the mobile file tree (MobileFiles.ts) renders notebook names via innerHTML without HTML escaping when processing renamenotebook WebSocket events. The desktop version (Files.ts) properly uses escapeHtml() for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree. Since Electron is configured with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to full remote code execution. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the mobile file tree (MobileFiles.ts) renders notebook names via innerHTML without HTML escaping when processing renamenotebook WebSocket events. The desktop version (Files.ts) properly uses escapeHtml() for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree. Since Electron is configured with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to full remote code execution. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32751</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qr46-rcv3-4hq3 — SiYuan Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qr46-rcv3-4hq3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan&amp;#39;s mobile file tree (`MobileFiles.ts`) renders notebook names via `innerHTML` without HTML escaping when processing `renamenotebook` WebSocket events. The desktop version (`Files.ts`) properly uses `escapeHtml()` for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since Electron is configured with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to **full remote code execution**. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Vulnerable file:** `app/src/mobile/dock/MobileFiles.ts:77`
- **Safe counterpart:** `app/src/layout/dock/Files.ts:104` (uses `escapeHtml`)
- **Backend (no escaping):** `kernel/api/notebook.go:104-116` (`renameNotebook`)
- **Electron config:** `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`)
- **Endpoint:** `POST /api/notebook/renameNotebook` (authenticated)
- **Version:** SiYuan &amp;lt;= 3.5.9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mobile — no escaping (MobileFiles.ts:77)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
case &amp;#34;renamenotebook&amp;#34;:
    this.element.querySelector(`[data-url=&amp;#34;${data.data.box}&amp;#34;] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = data.data.name;
    break;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Desktop — p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SiYuan&amp;#39;s mobile file tree (`MobileFiles.ts`) renders notebook names via `innerHTML` without HTML escaping when processing `renamenotebook` WebSocket events. The desktop version (`Files.ts`) properly uses `escapeHtml()` for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since Electron is configured with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to **full remote code execution**. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Vulnerable file:** `app/src/mobile/dock/MobileFiles.ts:77`
- **Safe counterpart:** `app/src/layout/dock/Files.ts:104` (uses `escapeHtml`)
- **Backend (no escaping):** `kernel/api/notebook.go:104-116` (`renameNotebook`)
- **Electron config:** `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`)
- **Endpoint:** `POST /api/notebook/renameNotebook` (authenticated)
- **Version:** SiYuan &amp;lt;= 3.5.9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mobile — no escaping (MobileFiles.ts:77)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
case &amp;#34;renamenotebook&amp;#34;:
    this.element.querySelector(`[data-url=&amp;#34;${data.data.box}&amp;#34;] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = data.data.name;
    break;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Desktop — p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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