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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276580</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276580</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276580</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276580</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32731</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32731</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source content management framework. Prior to version 3.5.3 of `@apostrophecms/import-export`,
The `extract()` function in `gzip.js` constructs file-write paths using `fs.createWriteStream(path.join(exportPath, header.name))`. `path.join()` does not resolve or sanitise traversal segments such as `../`. It concatenates them as-is, meaning a tar entry named `../../evil.js` resolves to a path outside the intended extraction directory. No canonical-path check is performed before the write stream is opened. This is a textbook Zip Slip vulnerability. Any user who has been granted the Global Content Modify permission — a role routinely assigned to content editors and site managers — can upload a crafted `.tar.gz` file through the standard CMS import UI and write attacker-controlled content to any path the Node.js process can reach on the host filesystem. Version 3.5.3 of `@apostrophecms/import-export` fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source content management framework. Prior to version 3.5.3 of `@apostrophecms/import-export`,
The `extract()` function in `gzip.js` constructs file-write paths using `fs.createWriteStream(path.join(exportPath, header.name))`. `path.join()` does not resolve or sanitise traversal segments such as `../`. It concatenates them as-is, meaning a tar entry named `../../evil.js` resolves to a path outside the intended extraction directory. No canonical-path check is performed before the write stream is opened. This is a textbook Zip Slip vulnerability. Any user who has been granted the Global Content Modify permission — a role routinely assigned to content editors and site managers — can upload a crafted `.tar.gz` file through the standard CMS import UI and write attacker-controlled content to any path the Node.js process can reach on the host filesystem. Version 3.5.3 of `@apostrophecms/import-export` fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32731</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mwxc-m426-3f78 — ApostropheCMS has Arbitrary File Write (Zip Slip / Path Traversal) in Import-Export Gzip Extraction</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mwxc-m426-3f78</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @apostrophecms/import-export&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Reported:** 2026-03-08  
**Status:** patched and released in version 3.5.3 of `@apostrophecms/import-export`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Repository | `apostrophecms/apostrophe` (monorepo) |
| Affected Package | `@apostrophecms/import-export` |
| Affected File | `packages/import-export/lib/formats/gzip.js` |
| Affected Function | `extract(filepath, exportPath)` — lines ~132–157 |
| Minimum Required Permission | **Global Content Modify** (any editor-level user with import access) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `extract()` function in `gzip.js` constructs file-write paths using:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
fs.createWriteStream(path.join(exportPath, header.name))
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`path.join()` does **not** resolve or sanitise traversal segments such as `../`. It concatenates them as-is, meaning a tar entry named `../../evil.js` resolves to a path **outside** the intended extraction directory. No canonical-path check is performed before the write stream is opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a textbook **Zip Slip** vulnerability. Any user who has been granted the **Global Content Modify** permission — a role routinely assigned to content editors and site managers — can upload a crafted `.tar.gz` file through the standard CMS import UI and write attacker-controlled content to **any path the Node.js process can reach on the host filesystem**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Security Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability provides **unauthenticated-equivalent arbitrary file write** to any user with content editor permissions. The full impa…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @apostrophecms/import-export&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Reported:** 2026-03-08  
**Status:** patched and released in version 3.5.3 of `@apostrophecms/import-export`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Repository | `apostrophecms/apostrophe` (monorepo) |
| Affected Package | `@apostrophecms/import-export` |
| Affected File | `packages/import-export/lib/formats/gzip.js` |
| Affected Function | `extract(filepath, exportPath)` — lines ~132–157 |
| Minimum Required Permission | **Global Content Modify** (any editor-level user with import access) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `extract()` function in `gzip.js` constructs file-write paths using:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
fs.createWriteStream(path.join(exportPath, header.name))
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`path.join()` does **not** resolve or sanitise traversal segments such as `../`. It concatenates them as-is, meaning a tar entry named `../../evil.js` resolves to a path **outside** the intended extraction directory. No canonical-path check is performed before the write stream is opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a textbook **Zip Slip** vulnerability. Any user who has been granted the **Global Content Modify** permission — a role routinely assigned to content editors and site managers — can upload a crafted `.tar.gz` file through the standard CMS import UI and write attacker-controlled content to **any path the Node.js process can reach on the host filesystem**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Security Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability provides **unauthenticated-equivalent arbitrary file write** to any user with content editor permissions. The full impa…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mwxc-m426-3f78</guid>
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