https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:51:19 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276435 EUVD-2026-276435 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276435 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32694 <p>In Juju from version 3.0.0 through 3.6.18, when a secret owner grants permissions to a secret to a grantee, the secret owner relies exclusively on a predictable XID of the secret to verify ownership. This allows a malicious grantee which can request secrets to predict past secrets granted by the same secret owner to different grantees, allowing them to use the resources granted by those past secrets. Successful exploitation relies on a very specific configuration, specific data semantic, and the administrator having the need to deploy at least two different applications, one of them controlled by the attacker.</p> <p>In Juju from version 3.0.0 through 3.6.18, when a secret owner grants permissions to a secret to a grantee, the secret owner relies exclusively on a predictable XID of the secret to verify ownership. This allows a malicious grantee which can request secrets to predict past secrets granted by the same secret owner to different grantees, allowing them to use the resources granted by those past secrets. Successful exploitation relies on a very specific configuration, specific data semantic, and the administrator having the need to deploy at least two different applications, one of them controlled by the attacker.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32694 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5cj2-rqqf-hx9p <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/juju/juju</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Predictable secret ID and lack of secret origin API enable confused deputy attacks on Juju workloads.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>A Juju application can create a secret and grant it to another integrated application (grantee).</p> <p>When they do so, the secret owner has to communicate the secret id to the grantee.</p> <p>The grantee, having received the secret id can load the secret content and perform operations on behalf of the secret owner.</p> <p>However, today the grantee has no way to determine which granted secret belongs to which owner.</p> <p>Instead the grantee relies on: - being able to read the secret by id (secret was in fact granted, by some entity) - secret id was received over a relation (the remote end of the relation is presumed to be secret owner)</p> <p>Additionally, secret IDs are XID, which are predictable, here two secrets created by two distinct apps in the same K8s model close in time: ``` d34vsl7mp25c76301hs0 time (UTC): 2025-09-17 00:18:28 (Unix 1758068308) machine: f6c88a pid: 50072 counter: 6294648</p> <p>d34vslfmp25c76301hsg time (UTC): 2025-09-17 00:18:29 (Unix 1758068309) machine: f6c88a pid: 50072 counter: 6294649 ```</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>This allows for an IDOR attack where: - actors: - a **Good** application (the owner of the _Victim_), - an **Evil** application, and - a **Provider** application (the _Confused Deputy_) - relations: **Good** --- **Provider**, **Evil** --- **Provider** - secrets: **Good** and **Evil** create _Secrets_, granting them to the **Provider** and communica…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/juju/juju</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Predictable secret ID and lack of secret origin API enable confused deputy attacks on Juju workloads.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>A Juju application can create a secret and grant it to another integrated application (grantee).</p> <p>When they do so, the secret owner has to communicate the secret id to the grantee.</p> <p>The grantee, having received the secret id can load the secret content and perform operations on behalf of the secret owner.</p> <p>However, today the grantee has no way to determine which granted secret belongs to which owner.</p> <p>Instead the grantee relies on: - being able to read the secret by id (secret was in fact granted, by some entity) - secret id was received over a relation (the remote end of the relation is presumed to be secret owner)</p> <p>Additionally, secret IDs are XID, which are predictable, here two secrets created by two distinct apps in the same K8s model close in time: ``` d34vsl7mp25c76301hs0 time (UTC): 2025-09-17 00:18:28 (Unix 1758068308) machine: f6c88a pid: 50072 counter: 6294648</p> <p>d34vslfmp25c76301hsg time (UTC): 2025-09-17 00:18:29 (Unix 1758068309) machine: f6c88a pid: 50072 counter: 6294649 ```</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>This allows for an IDOR attack where: - actors: - a **Good** application (the owner of the _Victim_), - an **Evil** application, and - a **Provider** application (the _Confused Deputy_) - relations: **Good** --- **Provider**, **Evil** --- **Provider** - secrets: **Good** and **Evil** create _Secrets_, granting them to the **Provider** and communica…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5cj2-rqqf-hx9p