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EUVD-2026-291611

fkie_cve-2026-32271

Craft Commerce is an ecommerce platform for Craft CMS. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.10.2 and 5.0.0 through 5.5.4, there is an SQL injection vulnerability in the Commerce TotalRevenue widget which allows any authenticated control panel user to achieve remote code execution through a four-step exploitation chain. The attack exploits unsanitized widget settings interpolated into SQL expressions, combined with PDO's default multi-statement query support, to inject a maliciously serialized PHP object into the queue table. When the queue consumer processes the injected job, the unrestricted unserialize() call in yii2-queue instantiates a GuzzleHttp FileCookieJar gadget chain whose __destruct() method writes a PHP webshell to the server's webroot. The complete chain requires only three HTTP requests, no administrative privileges, and results in arbitrary command execution as the PHP process user, with queue processing triggered via an unauthenticated endpoint. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.10.3 and 5.5.5.

GHSA-875v-7m49-8x88 — Craft Commerce has a SQL Injection can lead to Remote Code Execution via TotalRevenue Widget

Affected: Packagist: craftcms/commerce

## Summary

A SQL injection in the Commerce TotalRevenue widget can lead to remote code execution through a chain of four vulnerabilities:

* SQL Injection -- The TotalRevenue stat interpolates unsanitized widget settings directly into a sprintf-based SQL Expression. Any control panel user can create any widget type without permission checks.

* PDO Multi-Statement Queries -- PHP `PDO MySQL` enables `CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS` by default. Neither Yii2 nor Craft CMS disables it. This allows stacking an INSERT statement after the injected SELECT , writing a maliciously serialized PHP object into the queue table.

* Unrestricted `unserialize()` -- The yii2-queue PhpSerializer calls `unserialize()` with no allowed_classes restriction on every queue job. When the queue consumer processes the injected job, it instantiates the attacker-controlled object.

* Gadget Chain (FileCookieJar) -- `GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar` (a standard Guzzle dependency) has an unguarded `__destruct()` method that calls `file_put_contents()`. The attacker’s serialized payload writes a PHP webshell to the server’s webroot. PHP tags survive `json_encode()` because Guzzle uses `options=0` (no `JSON_HEX_TAG`).

The complete chain requires 3 HTTP requests and achieves arbitrary command execution as the PHP process user. Queue processing is triggered via GET `/actions/queue/run`, an endpoint that requires no authentication (`$allowAnonymous = ['run']`).

## RCE Exploitation Steps

* Authenticate as any cont…