https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:12:53 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275910 EUVD-2026-275910 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275910 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32245 <p>Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.0.3, the OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client&#39;s authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.0.3.</p> <p>Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.0.3, the OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client&#39;s authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.0.3.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32245 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xg2q-62g2-cvcm <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client&#39;s authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>When an authorization code is created, `StoreCode` at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:305-322` correctly stores the `ClientID` alongside the code hash in the database (line 316).</p> <p>During token exchange at `internal/controller/oidc_controller.go:267-309`, the handler retrieves the code entry at line 268 and validates the `redirect_uri` at line 291, but never compares `entry.ClientID` against the requesting client&#39;s ID (`creds.ClientID`). The code proceeds directly to `GenerateAccessToken` at line 299.</p> <p>The developers clearly intended this check to exist, the refresh token flow at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:508-510` has the exact guard: `if entry.ClientID != reqClientId { return TokenResponse{}, ErrInvalidClient }`. It was simply omitted from the authorization code grant.</p> <p>The `entry.ClientID` field is stored in the database but never read during authorization code exchange.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>Prerequisites: a tinyauth instance with two OIDC clients configured (Client A and Client B). Both clients must have at least one overlapping redirect URI, or the attacker must be able to intercept the authorizati…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client&#39;s authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>When an authorization code is created, `StoreCode` at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:305-322` correctly stores the `ClientID` alongside the code hash in the database (line 316).</p> <p>During token exchange at `internal/controller/oidc_controller.go:267-309`, the handler retrieves the code entry at line 268 and validates the `redirect_uri` at line 291, but never compares `entry.ClientID` against the requesting client&#39;s ID (`creds.ClientID`). The code proceeds directly to `GenerateAccessToken` at line 299.</p> <p>The developers clearly intended this check to exist, the refresh token flow at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:508-510` has the exact guard: `if entry.ClientID != reqClientId { return TokenResponse{}, ErrInvalidClient }`. It was simply omitted from the authorization code grant.</p> <p>The `entry.ClientID` field is stored in the database but never read during authorization code exchange.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>Prerequisites: a tinyauth instance with two OIDC clients configured (Client A and Client B). Both clients must have at least one overlapping redirect URI, or the attacker must be able to intercept the authorizati…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xg2q-62g2-cvcm