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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 08:24:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-32060 — OpenClaw has a path traversal in apply_patch could write/delete files outside the workspace</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32060</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions, when `apply_patch` was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.13`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The non-sandbox path resolution in `apply_patch` did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like `../../...` or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Practical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled` disabled if you do not need `apply_patch`.
- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` at its secure default of `true`.
- Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Configuration Note&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405
- Merge commit: `5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions, when `apply_patch` was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.13`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The non-sandbox path resolution in `apply_patch` did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like `../../...` or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Practical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled` disabled if you do not need `apply_patch`.
- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` at its secure default of `true`.
- Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Configuration Note&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405
- Merge commit: `5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32060</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-316817</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-316817</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-316817</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-316817</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32060</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32060</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a path traversal vulnerability in apply_patch that allows attackers to write or delete files outside the configured workspace directory. When apply_patch is enabled without filesystem sandbox containment, attackers can exploit crafted paths including directory traversal sequences or absolute paths to escape workspace boundaries and modify arbitrary files.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a path traversal vulnerability in apply_patch that allows attackers to write or delete files outside the configured workspace directory. When apply_patch is enabled without filesystem sandbox containment, attackers can exploit crafted paths including directory traversal sequences or absolute paths to escape workspace boundaries and modify arbitrary files.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32060</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r5fq-947m-xm57 — OpenClaw has a path traversal in apply_patch could write/delete files outside the workspace</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r5fq-947m-xm57</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions, when `apply_patch` was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.13`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The non-sandbox path resolution in `apply_patch` did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like `../../...` or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Practical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled` disabled if you do not need `apply_patch`.
- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` at its secure default of `true`.
- Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Configuration Note&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405
- Merge commit: `5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions, when `apply_patch` was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.13`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The non-sandbox path resolution in `apply_patch` did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like `../../...` or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Practical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled` disabled if you do not need `apply_patch`.
- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` at its secure default of `true`.
- Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Configuration Note&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405
- Merge commit: `5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r5fq-947m-xm57</guid>
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