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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 20:32:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-275725</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275725</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-275725</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275725</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-31861</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-31861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only &amp;#34; is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only &amp;#34; is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-31861</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2 — @siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Shell Command Injection in Git Routes</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7fv4-fmmc-86g2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @siteboon/claude-code-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | High |
| **CVSS 3.1** | 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 |
| **CWE** | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (&amp;#39;OS Command Injection&amp;#39;) |
| **Attack Vector** | Network |
| **Authentication** | JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) |
| **Affected Files** | `server/routes/user.js` (lines 58-59) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/api/user/git-config` endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied `gitName` and `gitEmail` values into command strings passed to `child_process.exec()`. The input is placed within double quotes and only `&amp;#34;` is escaped, but backticks (`` ` ``), `$()` command substitution, and `\` sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`server/routes/user.js` lines 58-59:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
await execAsync(`git config --global user.name &amp;#34;${gitName.replace(/&amp;#34;/g, &amp;#39;\\&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)}&amp;#34;`);
await execAsync(`git config --global user.email &amp;#34;${gitEmail.replace(/&amp;#34;/g, &amp;#39;\\&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)}&amp;#34;`);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only `&amp;#34;` is escaped. However, within double-quoted bash strings, the following are still interpreted:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `` `malicious_command` `` — backtick execution
- `$(malicious_command)` — subshell execution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** — arbitrary OS commands execute as the Node.js process user
- The `git…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @siteboon/claude-code-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | High |
| **CVSS 3.1** | 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 |
| **CWE** | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (&amp;#39;OS Command Injection&amp;#39;) |
| **Attack Vector** | Network |
| **Authentication** | JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) |
| **Affected Files** | `server/routes/user.js` (lines 58-59) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/api/user/git-config` endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied `gitName` and `gitEmail` values into command strings passed to `child_process.exec()`. The input is placed within double quotes and only `&amp;#34;` is escaped, but backticks (`` ` ``), `$()` command substitution, and `\` sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`server/routes/user.js` lines 58-59:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
await execAsync(`git config --global user.name &amp;#34;${gitName.replace(/&amp;#34;/g, &amp;#39;\\&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)}&amp;#34;`);
await execAsync(`git config --global user.email &amp;#34;${gitEmail.replace(/&amp;#34;/g, &amp;#39;\\&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)}&amp;#34;`);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only `&amp;#34;` is escaped. However, within double-quoted bash strings, the following are still interpreted:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `` `malicious_command` `` — backtick execution
- `$(malicious_command)` — subshell execution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** — arbitrary OS commands execute as the Node.js process user
- The `git…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7fv4-fmmc-86g2</guid>
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