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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-274250</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-274250</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-274250</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-274250</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-3125</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-3125</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package, resulting from a path normalization bypass in the /cdn-cgi/image/ handler.The @opennextjs/cloudflare worker template includes a /cdn-cgi/image/ handler intended for development use only. In production, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s edge intercepts /cdn-cgi/image/ requests before they reach the Worker. However, by substituting a backslash for a forward slash (/cdn-cgi\image/ instead of /cdn-cgi/image/), an attacker can bypass edge interception and have the request reach the Worker directly. The JavaScript URL class then normalizes the backslash to a forward slash, causing the request to match the handler and trigger an unvalidated fetch of arbitrary remote URLs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://victim-site.com/cdn-cgi\image/aaaa/https://attacker.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site&amp;#39;s domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: This bypass only works via HTTP clients that preserve backslashes in paths (e.g., curl --path-as-is). Browsers normalize backslashes to forward slashes before sending requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, Cloudflare Workers with Assets and Cloudflare Pages suffer from a similar vulnerability. Assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths are not publicly accessible under normal conditions. However, using the same backslash bypass (/cdn-cgi\... instead of /cdn-…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package, resulting from a path normalization bypass in the /cdn-cgi/image/ handler.The @opennextjs/cloudflare worker template includes a /cdn-cgi/image/ handler intended for development use only. In production, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s edge intercepts /cdn-cgi/image/ requests before they reach the Worker. However, by substituting a backslash for a forward slash (/cdn-cgi\image/ instead of /cdn-cgi/image/), an attacker can bypass edge interception and have the request reach the Worker directly. The JavaScript URL class then normalizes the backslash to a forward slash, causing the request to match the handler and trigger an unvalidated fetch of arbitrary remote URLs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://victim-site.com/cdn-cgi\image/aaaa/https://attacker.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site&amp;#39;s domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: This bypass only works via HTTP clients that preserve backslashes in paths (e.g., curl --path-as-is). Browsers normalize backslashes to forward slashes before sending requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, Cloudflare Workers with Assets and Cloudflare Pages suffer from a similar vulnerability. Assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths are not publicly accessible under normal conditions. However, using the same backslash bypass (/cdn-cgi\... instead of /cdn-…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-3125</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c7mq-gh6q-6q7c — opennextjs-cloudflare has SSRF vulnerability via /cdn-cgi/ path normalization bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c7mq-gh6q-6q7c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @opennextjs/cloudflare&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package, resulting from a path normalization bypass in the /cdn-cgi/image/ handler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The @opennextjs/cloudflare worker template includes a /cdn-cgi/image/ handler intended for development use only. In production, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s edge intercepts /cdn-cgi/image/ requests before they reach the Worker. However, by substituting a backslash for a forward slash (/cdn-cgi\image/ instead of /cdn-cgi/image/), an attacker can bypass edge interception and have the request reach the Worker directly. The JavaScript URL class then normalizes the backslash to a forward slash, causing the request to match the handler and trigger an unvalidated fetch of arbitrary remote URLs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example: https://victim-site.com/cdn-cgi\image/aaaa/https://attacker.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site&amp;#39;s domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: This bypass only works via HTTP clients that preserve backslashes in paths (e.g., curl --path-as-is). Browsers normalize backslashes to forward slashes before sending requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, Cloudflare Workers with Assets and Cloudflare Pages  suffer from a similar vulnerability. Assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths are not publicly accessible under normal conditions. However, using the same backslash bypass (/cdn-cgi\... instead of /cdn-c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @opennextjs/cloudflare&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package, resulting from a path normalization bypass in the /cdn-cgi/image/ handler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The @opennextjs/cloudflare worker template includes a /cdn-cgi/image/ handler intended for development use only. In production, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s edge intercepts /cdn-cgi/image/ requests before they reach the Worker. However, by substituting a backslash for a forward slash (/cdn-cgi\image/ instead of /cdn-cgi/image/), an attacker can bypass edge interception and have the request reach the Worker directly. The JavaScript URL class then normalizes the backslash to a forward slash, causing the request to match the handler and trigger an unvalidated fetch of arbitrary remote URLs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example: https://victim-site.com/cdn-cgi\image/aaaa/https://attacker.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site&amp;#39;s domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: This bypass only works via HTTP clients that preserve backslashes in paths (e.g., curl --path-as-is). Browsers normalize backslashes to forward slashes before sending requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, Cloudflare Workers with Assets and Cloudflare Pages  suffer from a similar vulnerability. Assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths are not publicly accessible under normal conditions. However, using the same backslash bypass (/cdn-cgi\... instead of /cdn-c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c7mq-gh6q-6q7c</guid>
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