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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-323911</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323911</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-323911</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323911</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-30963</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-30963</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. To defend against namespace hijacking achieved through update/patch operations on namespaces, Capsule uses a webhook to validate update requests targeting namespaces. However, in Kubernetes, the namespace/finalize and namespace/status subresource APIs can also modify various fields of a namespace, including the metadata field. Prior to version 0.13.0, the webhook does not define interception rules for these subresources. As a result, if a tenant administrator has permission to modify namespace/status or namespace/finalize, they can successfully perform namespace hijacking. Version 0.13.0 fixes the issue. Another mitigation is to add two subresources (namespaces and snamespaces/status with namespace/finalize within it) to the resources list in the ValidatingWebhookConfiguration rules.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. To defend against namespace hijacking achieved through update/patch operations on namespaces, Capsule uses a webhook to validate update requests targeting namespaces. However, in Kubernetes, the namespace/finalize and namespace/status subresource APIs can also modify various fields of a namespace, including the metadata field. Prior to version 0.13.0, the webhook does not define interception rules for these subresources. As a result, if a tenant administrator has permission to modify namespace/status or namespace/finalize, they can successfully perform namespace hijacking. Version 0.13.0 fixes the issue. Another mitigation is to add two subresources (namespaces and snamespaces/status with namespace/finalize within it) to the resources list in the ValidatingWebhookConfiguration rules.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-30963</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2ww6-hf35-mfjm — Capsule Namespace Hijacking via subresource</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2ww6-hf35-mfjm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/projectcapsule/capsule&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
To defend against namespace hijacking achieved through update/patch operations on namespaces, Capsule uses a webhook to validate update requests targeting namespaces. However, in Kubernetes, the namespace/finalize and namespace/status subresource APIs can also modify various fields of a namespace, including the metadata field. The webhook does not define interception rules for these subresources. As a result, if a tenant administrator has permission to modify namespace/status or namespace/finalize, they can successfully perform namespace hijacking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
When Capsule uses a ValidatingWebhookConfiguration to intercept changes to namespace resources, it does not intercept modification requests initiated through namespace subresource APIs (see: https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule/blob/main/charts/capsule/templates/validatingwebhookconfiguration.yaml#L193). Through subresource APIs, it is still possible to modify the metadata field of a namespace resource, enabling hijacking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Open two terminals and create two tenants:
```
kubectl create -f - &amp;lt;&amp;lt; EOF
apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2
kind: Tenant
metadata:
  name: oil
spec:
  owners:
  - name: alice
    kind: User
EOF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;./hack/create-user.sh alice solar
export KUBECONFIG=alice-solar.kubeconfig
kubectl create namespace solar-production # alice creates the namespace
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
kubectl create -f - &amp;lt;&amp;lt; EOF
apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2
kind: Tenant
metadata:
  name: attacker
spec:
  owners:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/projectcapsule/capsule&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
To defend against namespace hijacking achieved through update/patch operations on namespaces, Capsule uses a webhook to validate update requests targeting namespaces. However, in Kubernetes, the namespace/finalize and namespace/status subresource APIs can also modify various fields of a namespace, including the metadata field. The webhook does not define interception rules for these subresources. As a result, if a tenant administrator has permission to modify namespace/status or namespace/finalize, they can successfully perform namespace hijacking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
When Capsule uses a ValidatingWebhookConfiguration to intercept changes to namespace resources, it does not intercept modification requests initiated through namespace subresource APIs (see: https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule/blob/main/charts/capsule/templates/validatingwebhookconfiguration.yaml#L193). Through subresource APIs, it is still possible to modify the metadata field of a namespace resource, enabling hijacking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Open two terminals and create two tenants:
```
kubectl create -f - &amp;lt;&amp;lt; EOF
apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2
kind: Tenant
metadata:
  name: oil
spec:
  owners:
  - name: alice
    kind: User
EOF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;./hack/create-user.sh alice solar
export KUBECONFIG=alice-solar.kubeconfig
kubectl create namespace solar-production # alice creates the namespace
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
kubectl create -f - &amp;lt;&amp;lt; EOF
apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2
kind: Tenant
metadata:
  name: attacker
spec:
  owners:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2ww6-hf35-mfjm</guid>
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