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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-275005</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275005</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-275005</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275005</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-30832</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-30832</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Soft Serve is a self-hostable Git server for the command line. From version 0.6.0 to before version 0.11.4, an authenticated SSH user can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal/private IP addresses by running repo import with a crafted --lfs-endpoint URL. The initial batch request is blind (the response from a metadata endpoint won&amp;#39;t parse as valid LFS JSON), but an attacker hosting a fake LFS server can chain this into full read access to internal services by returning download URLs that point at internal targets. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Soft Serve is a self-hostable Git server for the command line. From version 0.6.0 to before version 0.11.4, an authenticated SSH user can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal/private IP addresses by running repo import with a crafted --lfs-endpoint URL. The initial batch request is blind (the response from a metadata endpoint won&amp;#39;t parse as valid LFS JSON), but an attacker hosting a fake LFS server can chain this into full read access to internal services by returning download URLs that point at internal targets. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-30832</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3fvx-xrxq-8jvv — soft-serve vulnerable to SSRF via unvalidated LFS endpoint in repo import</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fvx-xrxq-8jvv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While auditing the codebase in the wake of the webhook SSRF fix shipped in v0.11.1 (GHSA-vwq2-jx9q-9h9f), it was identified that the LFS import path was never given the same treatment. The webhook fix introduced dual-layer SSRF protection — ValidateWebhookURL() at creation time and secureHTTPClient with IP validation at dial time — but the LFS HTTP client still uses http.DefaultClient with no filtering at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated SSH user can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal/private IP addresses by running `repo import` with a crafted `--lfs-endpoint` URL. The initial batch request is blind (the response from a metadata endpoint won&amp;#39;t parse as valid LFS JSON), but an attacker hosting a fake LFS server can chain this into full read access to internal services by returning download URLs that point at internal targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user-controlled endpoint flows through four files with zero validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. User supplies the URL via `--lfs-endpoint`** (`pkg/ssh/cmd/import.go:20-41`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
cmd.Flags().StringVarP(&amp;amp;lfsEndpoint, &amp;#34;lfs-endpoint&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;set the Git LFS endpoint&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The flag value is passed directly into `proto.RepositoryOptions{LFSEndpoint: lfsEndpoint}` at line 40 and then to `be.ImportRepository()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Access check passes for any authenticated user** (`pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172-187`, `pkg/backend/user.go:94-100`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The import command uses `checkIfCollab` as its `PersistentPreRunE`. For a new repo name (which is normal during…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While auditing the codebase in the wake of the webhook SSRF fix shipped in v0.11.1 (GHSA-vwq2-jx9q-9h9f), it was identified that the LFS import path was never given the same treatment. The webhook fix introduced dual-layer SSRF protection — ValidateWebhookURL() at creation time and secureHTTPClient with IP validation at dial time — but the LFS HTTP client still uses http.DefaultClient with no filtering at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated SSH user can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal/private IP addresses by running `repo import` with a crafted `--lfs-endpoint` URL. The initial batch request is blind (the response from a metadata endpoint won&amp;#39;t parse as valid LFS JSON), but an attacker hosting a fake LFS server can chain this into full read access to internal services by returning download URLs that point at internal targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user-controlled endpoint flows through four files with zero validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. User supplies the URL via `--lfs-endpoint`** (`pkg/ssh/cmd/import.go:20-41`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
cmd.Flags().StringVarP(&amp;amp;lfsEndpoint, &amp;#34;lfs-endpoint&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;set the Git LFS endpoint&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The flag value is passed directly into `proto.RepositoryOptions{LFSEndpoint: lfsEndpoint}` at line 40 and then to `be.ImportRepository()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Access check passes for any authenticated user** (`pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172-187`, `pkg/backend/user.go:94-100`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The import command uses `checkIfCollab` as its `PersistentPreRunE`. For a new repo name (which is normal during…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fvx-xrxq-8jvv</guid>
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