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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-273674</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273674</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-273674</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273674</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-27700</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27700</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions 4.12.0 and 4.12.1, when using the AWS Lambda adapter (`hono/aws-lambda`) behind an Application Load Balancer (ALB), the `getConnInfo()` function incorrectly selected the first value from the `X-Forwarded-For` header. Because AWS ALB appends the real client IP address to the end of the `X-Forwarded-For` header, the first value can be attacker-controlled. This could allow IP-based access control mechanisms (such as the `ipRestriction` middleware) to be bypassed. Version 4.12.2 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions 4.12.0 and 4.12.1, when using the AWS Lambda adapter (`hono/aws-lambda`) behind an Application Load Balancer (ALB), the `getConnInfo()` function incorrectly selected the first value from the `X-Forwarded-For` header. Because AWS ALB appends the real client IP address to the end of the `X-Forwarded-For` header, the first value can be attacker-controlled. This could allow IP-based access control mechanisms (such as the `ipRestriction` middleware) to be bypassed. Version 4.12.2 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27700</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3 — Hono is Vulnerable to Authentication Bypass by IP Spoofing in AWS Lambda ALB conninfo</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xh87-mx6m-69f3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: hono&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using the AWS Lambda adapter (`hono/aws-lambda`) behind an Application Load Balancer (ALB), the `getConnInfo()` function incorrectly selected the first value from the `X-Forwarded-For` header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because AWS ALB appends the real client IP address to the end of the `X-Forwarded-For` header, the first value can be attacker-controlled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This could allow IP-based access control mechanisms (such as the `ipRestriction` middleware) to be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ALB environments, AWS appends the actual client IP address to the end of any existing `X-Forwarded-For` header value. However, the previous implementation of `getConnInfo()` extracted the leftmost IP address:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
address = xff.split(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;)[0].trim()
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a client sent:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
X-Forwarded-For: &amp;lt;spoofed-ip&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALB would forward:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
X-Forwarded-For: &amp;lt;spoofed-ip&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;real-client-ip&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the implementation selected the first value, the spoofed IP address was trusted. This affected applications using:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
ipRestriction(getConnInfo, { allowList: [...] })
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;or any custom middleware relying on `getConnInfo(c).remote.address` for authorization decisions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only affects deployments using the AWS Lambda adapter behind an ALB. API Gateway (v1/v2) and Lambda Function URLs are not affected, as they use AWS-provided source IP values from `requestContext`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated remote attacker could bypass IP-based access restrictions by supplying a crafted `X-Forwarded-For` header. This ma…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: hono&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using the AWS Lambda adapter (`hono/aws-lambda`) behind an Application Load Balancer (ALB), the `getConnInfo()` function incorrectly selected the first value from the `X-Forwarded-For` header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because AWS ALB appends the real client IP address to the end of the `X-Forwarded-For` header, the first value can be attacker-controlled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This could allow IP-based access control mechanisms (such as the `ipRestriction` middleware) to be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ALB environments, AWS appends the actual client IP address to the end of any existing `X-Forwarded-For` header value. However, the previous implementation of `getConnInfo()` extracted the leftmost IP address:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
address = xff.split(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;)[0].trim()
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a client sent:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
X-Forwarded-For: &amp;lt;spoofed-ip&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALB would forward:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
X-Forwarded-For: &amp;lt;spoofed-ip&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;real-client-ip&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the implementation selected the first value, the spoofed IP address was trusted. This affected applications using:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
ipRestriction(getConnInfo, { allowList: [...] })
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;or any custom middleware relying on `getConnInfo(c).remote.address` for authorization decisions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only affects deployments using the AWS Lambda adapter behind an ALB. API Gateway (v1/v2) and Lambda Function URLs are not affected, as they use AWS-provided source IP values from `requestContext`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated remote attacker could bypass IP-based access restrictions by supplying a crafted `X-Forwarded-For` header. This ma…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xh87-mx6m-69f3</guid>
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