Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-270450

fkie_cve-2026-27111

Kargo manages and automates the promotion of software artifacts. From v1.9.0 to v1.9.2, Kargo's authorization model includes a promote verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes "dolphin verb" -- that gates the ability to advance Freight through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to manage promotion-related resources from the ability to trigger promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation. The promote verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (patch on freights/status or create on promotions). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately not granted promote -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary. The affected endpoints are /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve, /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions, and /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream. This vulnerability is fixed in v1.9.3.

GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 — Kargo has Missing Authorization Vulnerabilities in Approval & Promotion REST API Endpoints

Affected: Go: github.com/akuity/kargo

## Summary

Kargo's authorization model includes a `promote` verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes ["dolphin verb"](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-verbs/) -- that gates the ability to advance `Freight` through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to _manage_ promotion-related resources from the ability to _trigger_ promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation.

The `promote` verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (`patch` on `freights/status` or `create` on `promotions`). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately _not_ granted `promote` -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary.

The affected endpoints are:

1. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve`

Approves `Freight` for promotion to a specific `Stage`.

The endpoint is intended to require both `patch` permission on `Freight` status and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.

2. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions`

Promotes `Freight` to a specific `Stage`.

The endpoint is intended to require both `create` permission on `Promotion` resources and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.

3. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{pr…