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BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-26329 — OpenClaw has a path traversal in browser upload allows local file read

Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Summary

Authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root.

Severity remains **High** due to the impact (arbitrary local file read on the Gateway host), even though exploitation requires authenticated access.

## Exploitability / Preconditions

This is not a "drive-by" issue.

An attacker must:

- Reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints). - Present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration. - In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback. - Have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled).

If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Vulnerable: `< 2026.2.14` (includes latest published `2026.2.13`) - Patched: `>= 2026.2.14` (planned next release)

## Details

**Entry points**:

- `POST /tools/invoke` with `{"tool":"browser","action":"upload",...}` - `POST /hooks/file-chooser` (browser control hook)

When the upload paths are not validated, Playwright…

cnvd-2026-13295

EUVD-2026-268939

fkie_cve-2026-26329

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.

GHSA-cv7m-c9jx-vg7q — OpenClaw has a path traversal in browser upload allows local file read

Affected: npm: openclaw