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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 13:54:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-26317 — OpenClaw affected by cross-site request forgery (CSRF) through loopback browser mutation endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-26317</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim&amp;#39;s local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim&amp;#39;s browser context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- openclaw (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- clawdbot (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.1.24-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
The browser control servers bind to loopback but exposed mutating HTTP endpoints without a CSRF-style guard. Browsers may send cross-origin requests to loopback addresses; without explicit validation, state-changing operations could be triggered from a non-loopback Origin/Referer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
Mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- openclaw/openclaw: b566b09f81e2b704bf9398d8d97d5f7a90aa94c3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds / Mitigations
- Enable browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.
- Upgrade to a release that includes the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
- Reporter: @vincentkoc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is set to the planned next release version. Once that npm release is published, t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim&amp;#39;s local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim&amp;#39;s browser context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- openclaw (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- clawdbot (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.1.24-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
The browser control servers bind to loopback but exposed mutating HTTP endpoints without a CSRF-style guard. Browsers may send cross-origin requests to loopback addresses; without explicit validation, state-changing operations could be triggered from a non-loopback Origin/Referer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
Mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- openclaw/openclaw: b566b09f81e2b704bf9398d8d97d5f7a90aa94c3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds / Mitigations
- Enable browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.
- Upgrade to a release that includes the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
- Reporter: @vincentkoc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is set to the planned next release version. Once that npm release is published, t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-26317</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>cnvd-2026-13426</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-13426</link>
      <description>cnvd-2026-13426</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-13426</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-268954</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268954</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-268954</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268954</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-26317</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-26317</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.14, browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins. A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim&amp;#39;s local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim&amp;#39;s browser context. Starting in version 2026.2.14, mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`). Other mitigations include enabling browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.14, browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins. A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim&amp;#39;s local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim&amp;#39;s browser context. Starting in version 2026.2.14, mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`). Other mitigations include enabling browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-26317</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3fqr-4cg8-h96q — OpenClaw affected by cross-site request forgery (CSRF) through loopback browser mutation endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fqr-4cg8-h96q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw, npm: clawdbot&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim&amp;#39;s local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim&amp;#39;s browser context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- openclaw (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- clawdbot (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.1.24-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
The browser control servers bind to loopback but exposed mutating HTTP endpoints without a CSRF-style guard. Browsers may send cross-origin requests to loopback addresses; without explicit validation, state-changing operations could be triggered from a non-loopback Origin/Referer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
Mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- openclaw/openclaw: b566b09f81e2b704bf9398d8d97d5f7a90aa94c3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds / Mitigations
- Enable browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.
- Upgrade to a release that includes the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
- Reporter: @vincentkoc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is set to the planned next release version. Once that npm release is published, t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw, npm: clawdbot&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim&amp;#39;s local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim&amp;#39;s browser context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- openclaw (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- clawdbot (npm): &amp;lt;= 2026.1.24-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
The browser control servers bind to loopback but exposed mutating HTTP endpoints without a CSRF-style guard. Browsers may send cross-origin requests to loopback addresses; without explicit validation, state-changing operations could be triggered from a non-loopback Origin/Referer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
Mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- openclaw/openclaw: b566b09f81e2b704bf9398d8d97d5f7a90aa94c3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds / Mitigations
- Enable browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.
- Upgrade to a release that includes the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
- Reporter: @vincentkoc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is set to the planned next release version. Once that npm release is published, t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fqr-4cg8-h96q</guid>
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