https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 11:35:13 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267779 EUVD-2026-267779 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267779 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25761 <p>Super-linter is a combination of multiple linters to run as a GitHub Action or standalone. From 6.0.0 to 8.3.0, the Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to command injection via crafted filenames. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose name contains shell command substitution syntax, such as $(...). In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN depending on how the workflow configures permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.3.1.</p> <p>Super-linter is a combination of multiple linters to run as a GitHub Action or standalone. From 6.0.0 to 8.3.0, the Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to command injection via crafted filenames. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose name contains shell command substitution syntax, such as $(...). In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN depending on how the workflow configures permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.3.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25761 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r79c-pqj3-577x <p><strong>Affected:</strong> GitHub Actions: super-linter/super-linter, GitHub Actions: super-linter/super-linter/slim</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to **command injection via crafted filenames**. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose **name** contains shell command substitution syntax, such as `$(...)`. In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s `GITHUB_TOKEN` depending on how the workflow configures permissions.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The issue appears originates in the logic that scans the repository for changed files to check.</p> <p>1. Use a workflow that runs Super-linter on `pull_request` events. 2. Open a pull request that adds a new file with a crafted filename containing command substitution and an outbound request that includes `$GITHUB_TOKEN`. 3. Run the workflow.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>- **Arbitrary command execution** in the context of the workflow run that invokes Super-linter (triggered by attacker-controlled filenames in a PR). - **Credential exposure / misuse:** the injected command can read environment variables available to the action, including `GITHUB_TOKEN`.</p> <p>The level of exposure depends on the source of the pull request.</p> <p>To actively exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs have the ability to run workflows without any [approval from the repository admin](https://docs.github.com/en/acti…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> GitHub Actions: super-linter/super-linter, GitHub Actions: super-linter/super-linter/slim</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to **command injection via crafted filenames**. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose **name** contains shell command substitution syntax, such as `$(...)`. In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s `GITHUB_TOKEN` depending on how the workflow configures permissions.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The issue appears originates in the logic that scans the repository for changed files to check.</p> <p>1. Use a workflow that runs Super-linter on `pull_request` events. 2. Open a pull request that adds a new file with a crafted filename containing command substitution and an outbound request that includes `$GITHUB_TOKEN`. 3. Run the workflow.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>- **Arbitrary command execution** in the context of the workflow run that invokes Super-linter (triggered by attacker-controlled filenames in a PR). - **Credential exposure / misuse:** the injected command can read environment variables available to the action, including `GITHUB_TOKEN`.</p> <p>The level of exposure depends on the source of the pull request.</p> <p>To actively exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs have the ability to run workflows without any [approval from the repository admin](https://docs.github.com/en/acti…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r79c-pqj3-577x