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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:17:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-267316</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267316</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-267316</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267316</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-25059</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25059</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenList Frontend is a UI component for OpenList. Prior to 4.1.10, the application contains path traversal vulnerability in multiple file operation handlers in server/handles/fsmanage.go. Filename components in req.Names are directly concatenated with validated directories using stdpath.Join. This allows &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; sequences to bypass path restrictions, enabling users to access other users&amp;#39; files within the same storage mount and perform unauthorized actions such as deletion, renaming, or copying of files. An authenticated attacker can bypass directory-level authorisation by injecting traversal sequences into filename components, enabling unauthorised file removal and copying across user boundaries within the same storage mount. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.10.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenList Frontend is a UI component for OpenList. Prior to 4.1.10, the application contains path traversal vulnerability in multiple file operation handlers in server/handles/fsmanage.go. Filename components in req.Names are directly concatenated with validated directories using stdpath.Join. This allows &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; sequences to bypass path restrictions, enabling users to access other users&amp;#39; files within the same storage mount and perform unauthorized actions such as deletion, renaming, or copying of files. An authenticated attacker can bypass directory-level authorisation by injecting traversal sequences into filename components, enabling unauthorised file removal and copying across user boundaries within the same storage mount. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.10.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25059</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qmj2-8r24-xxcq — OpenList vulnerable to Path Traversal in file copy and remove handlers</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qmj2-8r24-xxcq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The application contains a Path Traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in multiple file operation handlers. An authenticated attacker can bypass directory-level authorisation by injecting traversal sequences into filename components, enabling unauthorised file removal and copying across user boundaries within the same storage mount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The application contains a Path Traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in multiple file operation handlers in *server/handles/fsmanage.go*. Filename components in `req.Names` are directly concatenated with validated directories using `stdpath.Join`. This allows &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; sequences to bypass path restrictions, enabling users to access other users&amp;#39; files within the same storage mount and perform unauthorized actions such as deletion, renaming, or copying of files.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[FsRemove](https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/server/handles/fsmanage.go#L284-L285):
~~~
func FsRemove(c *gin.Context) {
	// ...
	for _, name := range req.Names {
		err := fs.Remove(c, stdpath.Join(reqDir, name))
~~~&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[FsCopy](https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/server/handles/fsmanage.go#L163-L164):
~~~
func FsCopy(c *gin.Context) {
	// ...
	if !req.Overwrite {
		for _, name := range req.Names {
			if res, _ := fs.Get(c.Request.Context(), stdpath.Join(dstDir, name), &amp;amp;fs.GetArgs{NoLog: true}); res != nil {
~~~&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Scenario:​ A normal user (&amp;#34;alice&amp;#34;) bypasses directory restr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The application contains a Path Traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in multiple file operation handlers. An authenticated attacker can bypass directory-level authorisation by injecting traversal sequences into filename components, enabling unauthorised file removal and copying across user boundaries within the same storage mount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The application contains a Path Traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in multiple file operation handlers in *server/handles/fsmanage.go*. Filename components in `req.Names` are directly concatenated with validated directories using `stdpath.Join`. This allows &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; sequences to bypass path restrictions, enabling users to access other users&amp;#39; files within the same storage mount and perform unauthorized actions such as deletion, renaming, or copying of files.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[FsRemove](https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/server/handles/fsmanage.go#L284-L285):
~~~
func FsRemove(c *gin.Context) {
	// ...
	for _, name := range req.Names {
		err := fs.Remove(c, stdpath.Join(reqDir, name))
~~~&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[FsCopy](https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/server/handles/fsmanage.go#L163-L164):
~~~
func FsCopy(c *gin.Context) {
	// ...
	if !req.Overwrite {
		for _, name := range req.Names {
			if res, _ := fs.Get(c.Request.Context(), stdpath.Join(dstDir, name), &amp;amp;fs.GetArgs{NoLog: true}); res != nil {
~~~&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Scenario:​ A normal user (&amp;#34;alice&amp;#34;) bypasses directory restr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qmj2-8r24-xxcq</guid>
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