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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-266978</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266978</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-266978</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266978</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-24904</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-24904</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;TrustTunnel is an open-source VPN protocol with a rule bypass issue in versions prior to 0.9.115. In `tls_listener.rs`, `TlsListener::listen()` peeks 1024 bytes and calls `extract_client_random(...)`. If `parse_tls_plaintext` fails (for example, a fragmented/partial ClientHello split across TCP writes), `extract_client_random` returns `None`. In `rules.rs`, `RulesEngine::evaluate` only evaluates `client_random_prefix` when `client_random` is `Some(...)`. As a result, when extraction fails (`client_random == None`), any rule that relies on `client_random_prefix` matching is skipped and evaluation falls through to later rules. As an important semantics note: `client_random_prefix` is a match condition only. It does not mean &amp;#34;block non-matching prefixes&amp;#34; by itself. A rule with `client_random_prefix = ...` triggers its `action` only when the prefix matches (and the field is available to evaluate). Non-matches (or `None`) simply do not match that rule and continue to fall through. The vulnerability is fixed in version 0.9.115.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;TrustTunnel is an open-source VPN protocol with a rule bypass issue in versions prior to 0.9.115. In `tls_listener.rs`, `TlsListener::listen()` peeks 1024 bytes and calls `extract_client_random(...)`. If `parse_tls_plaintext` fails (for example, a fragmented/partial ClientHello split across TCP writes), `extract_client_random` returns `None`. In `rules.rs`, `RulesEngine::evaluate` only evaluates `client_random_prefix` when `client_random` is `Some(...)`. As a result, when extraction fails (`client_random == None`), any rule that relies on `client_random_prefix` matching is skipped and evaluation falls through to later rules. As an important semantics note: `client_random_prefix` is a match condition only. It does not mean &amp;#34;block non-matching prefixes&amp;#34; by itself. A rule with `client_random_prefix = ...` triggers its `action` only when the prefix matches (and the field is available to evaluate). Non-matches (or `None`) simply do not match that rule and continue to fall through. The vulnerability is fixed in version 0.9.115.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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