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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-268233</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268233</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-268233</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268233</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-24895</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-24895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FrankenPHP is a modern application server for PHP. Prior to 1.11.2, FrankenPHP’s CGI path splitting logic improperly handles Unicode characters during case conversion. The logic computes the split index (for finding .php) on a lowercased copy of the request path but applies that byte index to the original path. Because strings.ToLower() in Go can increase the byte length of certain UTF-8 characters (e.g., Ⱥ expands when lowercased), the computed index may not align with the correct position in the original string. This results in an incorrect SCRIPT_NAME and SCRIPT_FILENAME, potentially causing FrankenPHP to execute a file other than the one intended by the URI. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.11.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FrankenPHP is a modern application server for PHP. Prior to 1.11.2, FrankenPHP’s CGI path splitting logic improperly handles Unicode characters during case conversion. The logic computes the split index (for finding .php) on a lowercased copy of the request path but applies that byte index to the original path. Because strings.ToLower() in Go can increase the byte length of certain UTF-8 characters (e.g., Ⱥ expands when lowercased), the computed index may not align with the correct position in the original string. This results in an incorrect SCRIPT_NAME and SCRIPT_FILENAME, potentially causing FrankenPHP to execute a file other than the one intended by the URI. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.11.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-24895</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g966-83w7-6w38 — FrankenPHP's unicode case-folding length expansion causes incorrect split_path index (SCRIPT_NAME/PATH_INFO confusion)…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g966-83w7-6w38</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/dunglas/frankenphp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FrankenPHP’s CGI path splitting logic improperly handles Unicode characters during case conversion. The logic computes the split index (for finding `.php`) on a lowercased copy of the request path but applies that byte index to the original path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `strings.ToLower()` in Go can increase the byte length of certain UTF-8 characters (e.g., `Ⱥ` expands when lowercased), the computed index may not align with the correct position in the original string. This results in an incorrect `SCRIPT_NAME` and `SCRIPT_FILENAME`, potentially causing FrankenPHP to execute a file other than the one intended by the URI.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### **Details**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability resides in the `splitPos()` function and its usage within `splitCgiPath()`. The logic attempts to find the script extension (e.g., `.php`) in a case-insensitive manner by lowercasing the path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
lowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)
idx := strings.Index(lowerPath, strings.ToLower(split))
return idx + len(split)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is that the returned `idx` represents a byte offset within `lowerPath`. However, `splitCgiPath()` uses this index to slice the **original** `path`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
fc.docURI = path[:splitPos]
fc.pathInfo = path[splitPos:]
fc.scriptName = strings.TrimSuffix(path, fc.pathInfo)
fc.scriptFilename = sanitizedPathJoin(fc.documentRoot, fc.scriptName)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This logic relies on the assumption that `len(strings.ToLower(path)) == len(path)`. This assumption is false for certain Unicode characters. For example, the charac…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/dunglas/frankenphp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FrankenPHP’s CGI path splitting logic improperly handles Unicode characters during case conversion. The logic computes the split index (for finding `.php`) on a lowercased copy of the request path but applies that byte index to the original path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `strings.ToLower()` in Go can increase the byte length of certain UTF-8 characters (e.g., `Ⱥ` expands when lowercased), the computed index may not align with the correct position in the original string. This results in an incorrect `SCRIPT_NAME` and `SCRIPT_FILENAME`, potentially causing FrankenPHP to execute a file other than the one intended by the URI.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### **Details**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability resides in the `splitPos()` function and its usage within `splitCgiPath()`. The logic attempts to find the script extension (e.g., `.php`) in a case-insensitive manner by lowercasing the path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
lowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)
idx := strings.Index(lowerPath, strings.ToLower(split))
return idx + len(split)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is that the returned `idx` represents a byte offset within `lowerPath`. However, `splitCgiPath()` uses this index to slice the **original** `path`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
fc.docURI = path[:splitPos]
fc.pathInfo = path[splitPos:]
fc.scriptName = strings.TrimSuffix(path, fc.pathInfo)
fc.scriptFilename = sanitizedPathJoin(fc.documentRoot, fc.scriptName)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This logic relies on the assumption that `len(strings.ToLower(path)) == len(path)`. This assumption is false for certain Unicode characters. For example, the charac…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g966-83w7-6w38</guid>
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