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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 06:06:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-266266</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266266</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-266266</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266266</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-23885</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23885</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Alchemy is an open source content management system engine written in Ruby on Rails. Prior to versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.3, the application uses the Ruby `eval()` function to dynamically execute a string provided by the `resource_handler.engine_name` attribute in `Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy`. The vulnerability exists in `app/helpers/alchemy/resources_helper.rb` at line 28. The code explicitly bypasses security linting with `# rubocop:disable Security/Eval`, indicating that the use of a dangerous function was known but not properly mitigated. Since `engine_name` is sourced from module definitions that can be influenced by administrative configurations, it allows an authenticated attacker to escape the Ruby sandbox and execute arbitrary system commands on the host OS. Versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.3 fix the issue by replacing `eval()` with `send()`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Alchemy is an open source content management system engine written in Ruby on Rails. Prior to versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.3, the application uses the Ruby `eval()` function to dynamically execute a string provided by the `resource_handler.engine_name` attribute in `Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy`. The vulnerability exists in `app/helpers/alchemy/resources_helper.rb` at line 28. The code explicitly bypasses security linting with `# rubocop:disable Security/Eval`, indicating that the use of a dangerous function was known but not properly mitigated. Since `engine_name` is sourced from module definitions that can be influenced by administrative configurations, it allows an authenticated attacker to escape the Ruby sandbox and execute arbitrary system commands on the host OS. Versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.3 fix the issue by replacing `eval()` with `send()`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23885</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2762-657x-v979 — AlchemyCMS: Authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) via eval injection in ResourcesHelper</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2762-657x-v979</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: alchemy_cms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A vulnerability was discovered during a manual security audit of the AlchemyCMS source code. The application uses the Ruby `eval()` function to dynamically execute a string provided by the `resource_handler.engine_name` attribute in `Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability exists in `app/helpers/alchemy/resources_helper.rb` at line 28. The code explicitly bypasses security linting with `# rubocop:disable Security/Eval`, indicating that the use of a dangerous function was known but not properly mitigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since `engine_name` is sourced from module definitions that can be influenced by administrative configurations, it allows an authenticated attacker to escape the Ruby sandbox and execute arbitrary system commands on the host OS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But, for this attack to be possible local file access to the alchemy project or the source on a remote server is necessary in order to manipulate the module config file, though.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC (Proof of Concept)
The following standalone Ruby script demonstrates that the `eval` sink is directly exploitable:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
require &amp;#39;ostruct&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def resource_url_proxy(resource_handler)
  if resource_handler.engine_name &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !resource_handler.engine_name.empty?
    eval(resource_handler.engine_name)
  end
end&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Payload to create a file in /tmp directory
payload = &amp;#34;system(&amp;#39;touch /tmp/alchemy_rce_verified&amp;#39;); &amp;#39;main_app&amp;#39;&amp;#34;
handler = OpenStruct.new(engine_name: payload)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;resource_url_proxy(handler)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if File.exist?(&amp;#39;/tmp/alch…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: alchemy_cms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A vulnerability was discovered during a manual security audit of the AlchemyCMS source code. The application uses the Ruby `eval()` function to dynamically execute a string provided by the `resource_handler.engine_name` attribute in `Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability exists in `app/helpers/alchemy/resources_helper.rb` at line 28. The code explicitly bypasses security linting with `# rubocop:disable Security/Eval`, indicating that the use of a dangerous function was known but not properly mitigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since `engine_name` is sourced from module definitions that can be influenced by administrative configurations, it allows an authenticated attacker to escape the Ruby sandbox and execute arbitrary system commands on the host OS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But, for this attack to be possible local file access to the alchemy project or the source on a remote server is necessary in order to manipulate the module config file, though.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC (Proof of Concept)
The following standalone Ruby script demonstrates that the `eval` sink is directly exploitable:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
require &amp;#39;ostruct&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def resource_url_proxy(resource_handler)
  if resource_handler.engine_name &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !resource_handler.engine_name.empty?
    eval(resource_handler.engine_name)
  end
end&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Payload to create a file in /tmp directory
payload = &amp;#34;system(&amp;#39;touch /tmp/alchemy_rce_verified&amp;#39;); &amp;#39;main_app&amp;#39;&amp;#34;
handler = OpenStruct.new(engine_name: payload)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;resource_url_proxy(handler)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if File.exist?(&amp;#39;/tmp/alch…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2762-657x-v979</guid>
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