<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 23:39:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-266808</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266808</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-266808</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266808</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-23830</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23830</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Versions prior to 0.8.26 have a sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction`. The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups. However, before version 0.8.26, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () =&amp;gt; {}).constructor`). In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor. Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution). Version 0.8.26 patches this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Versions prior to 0.8.26 have a sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction`. The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups. However, before version 0.8.26, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () =&amp;gt; {}).constructor`). In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor. Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution). Version 0.8.26 patches this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23830</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 — SandboxJS has Sandbox Escape via Unprotected AsyncFunction Constructor</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @nyariv/sandboxjs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () =&amp;gt; {}).constructor`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const sandbox = require(&amp;#39;@nyariv/sandboxjs&amp;#39;);
const s = new sandbox.default();&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const payload = `
    const af = async ()…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @nyariv/sandboxjs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () =&amp;gt; {}).constructor`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const sandbox = require(&amp;#39;@nyariv/sandboxjs&amp;#39;);
const s = new sandbox.default();&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const payload = `
    const af = async ()…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
