<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 09:22:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-12435</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-12435</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-12435</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-12435</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-23012</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23012</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23012</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0926 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0926</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-315288</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-315288</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-315288</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-315288</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-23012</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23012</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running,
the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object
linked to the context&amp;#39;s call_controls list.  Let&amp;#39;s suppose the object is
deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is
executed against the same context.  The function tries to add the new
damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the
pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated. 
As a result, use-after-free happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface.  It is not
easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making
a definitely weird file writes, though.  Please refer to the report for
more details about the issue reproduction steps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the issue by making two changes.  Firstly, move the final
kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from
terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond reset.  This
makes any code that sees NULL ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond can safely assume the context
may not access damon_call() requests anymore.  Secondly, let damon_call()
to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the
already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running,
the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object
linked to the context&amp;#39;s call_controls list.  Let&amp;#39;s suppose the object is
deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is
executed against the same context.  The function tries to add the new
damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the
pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated. 
As a result, use-after-free happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface.  It is not
easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making
a definitely weird file writes, though.  Please refer to the report for
more details about the issue reproduction steps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the issue by making two changes.  Firstly, move the final
kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from
terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond reset.  This
makes any code that sees NULL ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond can safely assume the context
may not access damon_call() requests anymore.  Secondly, let damon_call()
to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the
already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23012</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mprh-g3xh-wh7r</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mprh-g3xh-wh7r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running,
the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object
linked to the context&amp;#39;s call_controls list.  Let&amp;#39;s suppose the object is
deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is
executed against the same context.  The function tries to add the new
damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the
pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated. 
As a result, use-after-free happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface.  It is not
easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making
a definitely weird file writes, though.  Please refer to the report for
more details about the issue reproduction steps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the issue by making two changes.  Firstly, move the final
kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from
terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond reset.  This
makes any code that sees NULL ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond can safely assume the context
may not access damon_call() requests anymore.  Secondly, let damon_call()
to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the
already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running,
the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object
linked to the context&amp;#39;s call_controls list.  Let&amp;#39;s suppose the object is
deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is
executed against the same context.  The function tries to add the new
damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the
pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated. 
As a result, use-after-free happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface.  It is not
easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making
a definitely weird file writes, though.  Please refer to the report for
more details about the issue reproduction steps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the issue by making two changes.  Firstly, move the final
kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from
terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond reset.  This
makes any code that sees NULL ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond can safely assume the context
may not access damon_call() requests anymore.  Secondly, let damon_call()
to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the
already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mprh-g3xh-wh7r</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-23012</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23012</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 99 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running, the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object linked to the context&amp;#39;s call_controls list.  Let&amp;#39;s suppose the object is deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is executed against the same context.  The function tries to add the new damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated. As a result, use-after-free happens. This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface.  It is not easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making a definitely weird file writes, though.  Please refer to the report for more details about the issue reproduction steps. Fix the issue by making two changes.  Firstly, move the final kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond reset.  This makes any code that sees NULL ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond can safely assume the context may not access damon_call() requests anymore.  Secondly, let damon_call() to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 99 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running, the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object linked to the context&amp;#39;s call_controls list.  Let&amp;#39;s suppose the object is deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is executed against the same context.  The function tries to add the new damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated. As a result, use-after-free happens. This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface.  It is not easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making a definitely weird file writes, though.  Please refer to the report for more details about the issue reproduction steps. Fix the issue by making two changes.  Firstly, move the final kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond reset.  This makes any code that sees NULL ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond can safely assume the context may not access damon_call() requests anymore.  Secondly, let damon_call() to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23012</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-0215 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0215</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu einer Denial-of-Service- Bedingung führen oder eine Speicherbeschädigung verursachen können.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu einer Denial-of-Service- Bedingung führen oder eine Speicherbeschädigung verursachen können.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0215</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
