<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 01:00:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-265716</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265716</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-265716</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265716</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-22820</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22820</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Outray openSource ngrok alternative. Prior to 0.1.5, a TOCTOU race condition vulnerability allows a user to exceed the set number of active tunnels in their subscription plan. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Outray openSource ngrok alternative. Prior to 0.1.5, a TOCTOU race condition vulnerability allows a user to exceed the set number of active tunnels in their subscription plan. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22820</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3pqc-836w-jgr7 — Outray cli is vulnerable to race conditions in tunnels creation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3pqc-836w-jgr7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: outray&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability allows a user to exceed the set number of active tunnels in their subscription plan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected conponent: `apps/web/src/routes/api/tunnel/register.ts`
- `/tunnel/register` endpoint code-:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// Check if tunnel already exists in database
          const [existingTunnel] = await db
            .select()
            .from(tunnels)
            .where(eq(tunnels.url, tunnelUrl));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const isReconnection = !!existingTunnel;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;console.log(
            `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Org: ${organizationId}, Tunnel: ${tunnelId}`,
          );
          console.log(
            `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Is Reconnection: ${isReconnection}`,
          );
          console.log(
            `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Plan: ${currentPlan}, Limit: ${tunnelLimit}`,
          );&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Check limits only for NEW tunnels (not reconnections)
          if (!isReconnection) {
            // Count active tunnels from Redis SET
            const activeCount = await redis.scard(setKey);
            console.log(
              `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Active count in Redis: ${activeCount}`,
            );&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// The current tunnel is NOT yet in the online_tunnels set (added after successful registration)
            // So we check if activeCount &amp;gt;= limit (not &amp;gt;)
            if (activeCount &amp;gt;= tunnelLimit) {
              console.log(
                `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] REJECTED - ${activeCount} &amp;gt;= ${tunnelLimit}`,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: outray&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability allows a user to exceed the set number of active tunnels in their subscription plan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected conponent: `apps/web/src/routes/api/tunnel/register.ts`
- `/tunnel/register` endpoint code-:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// Check if tunnel already exists in database
          const [existingTunnel] = await db
            .select()
            .from(tunnels)
            .where(eq(tunnels.url, tunnelUrl));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const isReconnection = !!existingTunnel;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;console.log(
            `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Org: ${organizationId}, Tunnel: ${tunnelId}`,
          );
          console.log(
            `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Is Reconnection: ${isReconnection}`,
          );
          console.log(
            `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Plan: ${currentPlan}, Limit: ${tunnelLimit}`,
          );&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Check limits only for NEW tunnels (not reconnections)
          if (!isReconnection) {
            // Count active tunnels from Redis SET
            const activeCount = await redis.scard(setKey);
            console.log(
              `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Active count in Redis: ${activeCount}`,
            );&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// The current tunnel is NOT yet in the online_tunnels set (added after successful registration)
            // So we check if activeCount &amp;gt;= limit (not &amp;gt;)
            if (activeCount &amp;gt;= tunnelLimit) {
              console.log(
                `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] REJECTED - ${activeCount} &amp;gt;= ${tunnelLimit}`,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3pqc-836w-jgr7</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
